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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis considers changes in the diplomacy of the Holy See with respect to the 
Middle East in the period between 1990 and 2003. Policies pursued by these changes 
were decisions of Pope John Paul II and involved (1) establishing full diplomatic 
relations between the Holy See and the State of Israel; (2) convening the Special 
Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for Lebanon, ending in the papal visit to Lebanon in 
May 1997; and (3) opposing the 1991 and 2003 U.S. led wars against Iraq. Asking 
whether ideas or interests explain these policies, the thesis argues that new circumstances 
occasioned a rethinking of the Holy See’s interests in light of the development of modern 
Catholic social teaching. In other words, ideas constituted interests. Principled belief in 
the dignity of the human person and the principle of solidarity shaped the Holy See’s 
perception of its interests and the substance of the Pope’s diplomacy. In making the 
argument, the thesis considers the Holy See’s role in international relations; the 
development of modern Catholic social teaching since Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical, 
Rerum Novarum; and case studies of John Paul II’s diplomacy with respect to Israel, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. ASKING THE QUESTION: WHY CHANGE?          
This thesis is about change, specifically new directions in the diplomacy of the 
Holy See with respect to the Middle East in a period beginning about 1990 and 
concluding in 2003, before the final illness and death of Pope John Paul II in 2005. The 
central question is whether ideas developed within modern Catholic social teaching or the 
Church’s own interests had the major part in shaping the new directions. The argument 
developed here will show that new circumstances prompted a rethinking of the Holy 
See’s interests in the Middle East in light of the Church’s modern social teaching. Once 
rethought, these new interests were pursued through diplomacy.   
Twenty years ago Lebanese scholar George Irani published The Papacy and the 
Middle East.1 At that time the Cold War was still the dominant fact of international 
relations and the political landscape of the Arab Middle East had not been altered by the 
events of the first Gulf War. Nonetheless, Irani’s characterization of the Holy See’s 
interests in the Middle East, from the beginning of the Second Vatican Council (1962) to 
the sixth year of the pontificate of Pope John Paul II (1984), applies to the past two 
decades as well. In this regard Irani wrote, 
Papal involvement in the Middle East has come to occupy a place of 
importance on the Holy See’s scale of priorities which is essentially 
motivated by a concern to protect the welfare of Catholic minorities, to 
promote peaceful coexistence, and to win respect for the human rights of 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims.2  
Irani investigated the Holy See’s involvement with respect to the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and the Lebanese civil war that began 
in 1975. In doing so he covered an entire range of diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives 
as well as religious elements involved in each of these issue-areas. This thesis considers 
events that took place between 1990 and 2003, events marked by the personal 
intervention of the late Pope John Paul II, and presented here as cases of public 
 
1 George Emile Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1962-1984 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). 
2 Ibid., 1. 
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diplomacy. These case-events are (1) the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the Holy See and the State of Israel; (2) the Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops 
for Lebanon, ending with the Pope’s pilgrimage to Lebanon in 1997; and (3) the papal 
interventions in 1991 and 2003 to prevent both the first Gulf War and the launch of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Studying these three cases one finds changes in both the substance of the Holy 
See’s policy and in the means used to intervene. For example, establishing diplomatic 
relations with the State of Israel ran counter to the Holy See’s long held policy of not 
forming such relations with states whose borders were undetermined and in dispute. 
Moreover, this move went against a traditional option on behalf of the Palestinian-Arab 
people. Likewise, seeking public results in important and politically contentious matters, 
putting the moral and personal prestige of the Pope on the line, had not been a hallmark 
of the modern papacy.  
B. DEVELOPING THE THESIS 
The first temptation was to understand the changes primarily by reference to the 
Catholic Church’s development of a mature and consolidated social teaching. Here 
explanation would entail tracing specific policy choices to clear ideas or beliefs. For 
example, beginning in 1967 the Holy See abandoned a policy primarily concerned with 
protecting Catholic rights in Jerusalem and the Holy Places, gradually substituting in its 
place one supporting the full civil and religious rights of all residents of the Holy Land, 
Israelis and Palestinians—Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Irani demonstrated how this 
change was guided by doctrinal developments proclaimed by the Second Vatican 
Council.3  
A second look at the shift in the Holy See’s policy toward Jerusalem and the Holy 
Places, however, indicated that this change in policy did not follow mechanically from a 
change in social doctrine. Other factors were involved. Chief among these was the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War, resulting in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.  
The subsequent Israeli announcement of the annexation of East Jerusalem, 
proclaiming undivided Jerusalem to be the “eternal capital” of the Jewish State, 
combined with abandonment of efforts to enforce the provisions of United Nations 
 
3 See Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East, 79-81. 
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Security Council Resolution 181 regarding an international status for Jerusalem. These 
events forced the Holy See to reassess its policy. Pragmatically modified through several 
steps, but eventually emphasizing spiritual concerns, human rights, and the civil and 
religious liberty of persons, the policy responded to realpolitik.4 The force of Israeli arms 
removed from the table the question of an international regime (corpus separatus) for 
Jerusalem, gradually placing the Holy City’s final status within the context of a future 
two state solution.  
A similar combination of factors existed with respect to the three case studies 
reported here. The cases demonstrate that the Holy See’s interventions came in response 
to changing circumstances on the ground. The definitive move to establish full diplomatic 
relations with Israel came only in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. Reacting to seemingly 
favorable conditions for achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and to the 
hopeful opening of the Madrid Conference in October 1991, Pope John Paul II agreed to 
negotiations leading to the 1993 decision to exchange ambassadors with Israel.5  
The Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for Lebanon was first announced 
on June 12, 1991. Meeting for three weeks at the Vatican in late autumn 1995, and 
concluding in Beirut on May 10-11, 1997, the Synod was the Pope’s ultimate response to 
the 1975-1990 civil wars. Such an undertaking was impossible to contemplate while the 
violence still raged. Only when some normalcy returned to the country was the project 
launched. This was after the 1989 Taif accords and Syrian military intervention to halt 
the mainly intra-Christian violence that erupted in 1990.6  
Finally, the Pope’s diplomatic initiatives to prevent the 1991 Gulf War and the 
American-led invasion of Iraq begun in March 2003 were obvious reactions to changing 
international circumstances. In both instances the Holy See was intervening on the world 
stage and publicly opposing United States policy. The major issue uncovered by the Iraq 
interventions concerns the moral principles of the just war theory. Both the Holy See and 
the United States used the just war tradition to defend their positions. However, different 
 
4 See Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East, 81-96. 
5 See Thomas Patrick Melady, The Ambassador’s Story: The United States and the Vatican in World 
Affairs (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1994), 124-136. 
6 See Carole H. Dagher, Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Post-War Challenge (New York: Palgrave, 
2001), 91-121, 181-199. 
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aspects of the tradition were emphasized, resulting in conflicting results. At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century there is division regarding the theory in Catholic circles and 
suspicion about its utility for shaping decisions about the legitimate use of force.7
Papal diplomacy in the Middle East was shaped by changing political realities and 
pragmatically timed to respond to change. Therefore, one should not exclude from 
analysis the ordinary concerns of traditional realism.8 Each of the following case studies 
entails consideration of the interests the Holy See was attempting to advance.  
Returning to Irani’s broad description of these interests, one finds that they had 
been expanded to encompass more than the Catholic Church’s own ecclesial concerns. 
Indeed, aware of its many interventions on behalf of Catholic interests throughout the 
twentieth century and before, the Holy See determined that a narrow championing of 
Catholic rights was not legitimate in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council, nor 
possible in the changing political landscapes. As Irani’s book makes clear, this 
determination was made before the cases reported here. The protection of Arab Christian 
communities, the promotion of ecumenical and interfaith dialogue, and the fostering of 
human rights were linked together before the outbreak of the first Gulf War. This triad of 
interests resembles the marriage of interests and values that often characterizes the 
foreign policy of the United States.9 Nonetheless, the case studies reveal more than lip 
service paid to values.  
Given these findings, the thesis defended here is stated as follows: The diplomatic 
initiatives of the Holy See in the Middle East were in response to changing political 
circumstances and required new policies to promote expanding interests—interests 
rethought within a social teaching maturing in the second half of the twentieth century. 




7 See Melady, The Ambassador’s Story, 95-123; see also Alan Cooperman, “Vatican Weighs In 
Against War,” The Washington Post, March 6, 2003, sec. A, p. 20. 
8 See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Scribner’s, 1932, 1960). 
9 See, e.g., National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002; Walter A. 
McDougall, “Back to Bedrock: The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 
(March/April 1997): 134-146.   
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C. IDEAS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING 
As evidence for significant changes in the Holy See’s foreign policy in the Middle 
East, the case studies reveal the linkage of modern Catholic social teaching to expanding 
interests in response to political change. At the core of this thesis is an understanding of 
how ideas (values, beliefs) shape changes in policy. In contemporary form, realism 
discounts the role of values in international relations, arguing that national interests and 
the ability to project power determine the policies that states pursue.10 This is a 
pessimistic view premised on “fear, self-help, and power maximization,” within which 
power is measured by material capacity and military strength.11   
The Holy See is the institutional embodiment of the Pope’s authority within the 
Catholic Church. No longer endowed with significant temporal power, the Holy See lacks 
the material capacity to compel respect for its interests. Consequently, the only power it 
wields is spiritual, dependent upon the moral authority of its witness and the ability to 
persuade. As Chapter III demonstrates, the Holy See was marginalized by the 
international community in the first decades of the twentieth century. During the Second 
World War, Pope Pius XII was hesitant in responding to the horrors of the Third Reich, 
significantly threatening the Church’s ability to address the modern world. In 1962, Pope 
John XXIII convened the Second Vatican Council, through which the Church sought to 
reposition itself as a moral voice with global reach. Speaking before the General 
Assembly for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Pope John Paul II 
recognized the moral dimension of his role as he approached the end of his address: 
I come before you, as did my predecessor Pope Paul VI exactly thirty 
years ago, not as one who exercises temporal power—these are his 
words—nor as a religious leader seeking special privileges for his 
community. I come before you as a witness: a witness to human dignity, a 
witness to hope, a witness to the conviction that the destiny of all nations 
lies in the hands of a merciful Providence.12  
 
10 See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001). 
11 Ibid., 32. 
12 Pope John Paul II, Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the 
United Nations Organization, New York, October 5, 1995, no. 17. This address and other references to 
speeches and documents of the Holy See may be accessed online by search through the official website of 
the Holy See, online at http://www.vatican.va/phome_en.htm (accessed February 2006). 
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Ideas, values, beliefs, and the persuasive power of moral discourse stock the 
arsenal the Holy See has to advance its interests within the international community.  As 
noted, these interests were identified, in large measure, by the modern development of 
Church social teaching. Put another way, interests are constituted by ideas. 
Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, and their colleagues share this view even 
while they distinguish between interests and ideas in describing how the latter help to 
explain foreign policy decisions.13 From their work, the category of principled beliefs is 
best able to account for how the Holy See’s diplomacy in the Middle East was 
formulated.14 Ideas in the form of principled beliefs serve as “road maps” in uncertain 
environments, providing moral direction when interests are shifting and material power is 
little or no use.15  
The pillars of modern Catholic social teaching are belief in the dignity of the 
human person and commitment to the principle of solidarity, the latter being a moral 
requirement of the unity of the human family. As articulated by Pope John XXIII, these 
commitments gave rise to the Church’s full embrace of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.16 Proclaimed by the Council and applied in the practice of the Church, 
these beliefs have been reinforced, providing at least two pathways through which ideas 
shaped policy. Modern Catholic social teaching provides a road map, directions for use in 
times of change. Moreover, it has additional force by means of institutional persistence.17  
D. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
To provide some understanding of the role the Pope plays in world politics, the 
history of this role and the status of the Holy See in the international community are 
considered in the second chapter. The discussion entails both the bilateral relations the 
Holy See enjoys with states and its unique status in the United Nations.  
 
13 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, 
and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).  
14 See Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 9. 
15 Ibid., 13-17. 
16 Usually the commitments of modern Catholic social teaching are presented in philosophical 
discourse, using the language of natural law theory. The biblical and remote theological basis for belief in 
the dignity and social nature of human existence is grounded in the creation story, culminating in Genesis 
1: 27: “God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and female he created 
them.” 
17 See Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 20-24.   
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Chapter III presents a brief sketch of Pope John Paul II and traces the 
development of modern Catholic social teaching, highlighting some of the principal 
elements. The hope is to foster understanding of both the man and the ideas he 
represented. 
The fourth chapter reports the case studies. They show how the late Pope 
addressed Jewish, Christian, and Muslim populations through his diplomacy in the 
Middle East, attempting to foster the protection of human rights and concern for the 
common good. For Israel, the engagement brought about a dramatic reversal in the 
relationship between the Jewish state and Holy See, resulting in full diplomatic relations 
between the two. In Lebanon the Pope’s intervention was aimed at correcting the extreme 
sectarian positions that characterized Lebanese politics and prevented reconciliation of 
the various Christian and Muslim communities. In order to do this, he helped forge 
among the several Catholic churches of the country a common agenda for a way forward, 
inviting the input of both the non-Catholic Christians of Lebanon and the Lebanese 
Muslims. Finally, in Iraq, where the aim was the peaceful resolution of international 
conflict and the norms of international law, John Paul II was interlocutor within the 
United Nations and personally engaged with the United States and Iraq—challenging all 
to abandon war as a means of settling disputes. 
The fifth and concluding chapter recapitulates and concludes the argument begun 






























                                                
II. THE HOLY SEE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
A. DEFINING “HOLY SEE” 
The Holy See is the institutional embodiment of the papal ministry, the Pope’s 
authority within the Catholic Church. The term includes both the Pope and the Roman 
Curia, the Church’s central administration. By the Lateran Treaty of 1929, the Vatican 
City State, where the Pope is temporal ruler, was established as a territorial endowment 
and the headquarters for the Holy See. Sometimes “the Vatican” is used as a shorthand 
reference to the Holy See. This is especially true in the popular media when referring to 
the Pope or the Roman Curia. However, this is understood analogously, in the same way 
one refers to an ambassador from the United States as the ambassador from 
“Washington” or an ambassador to the United Kingdom as the ambassador to the “Court 
of St. James’s.”18 It is important to keep in mind that the Holy See (spiritual entity) and 
not the Vatican City State (temporal entity) engages the international community and 
establishes diplomatic relations with international organizations and individual states.  
Originally, Holy See meant merely the diocese or see of Rome, the ultimate seat 
of Saint Peter the Apostle. Only as bishop of Rome and successor to Saint Peter does the 
Pope have special significance for the Catholic Church. The Code of Canon Law provides 
a specific institutional and juridical definition of the term: 
In this Code, the term Apostolic See or Holy See refers not only to the 
Roman Pontiff but also to the Secretariat of State, the Council for the 
Public Affairs of the Church, and other institutes of the Roman Curia, 
unless it is otherwise apparent from the nature of the matter or the context 
of the words.19
At present, neither the Holy See nor the Vatican City State is a sovereign nation 
state within the meaning of international law. The Holy See is a special case, an 
international spiritual sovereignty existing prior to and apart from territorial possessions. 
If deprived of territory, as was the case from 1870 to 1929, the Holy See would still exist. 
Unlike other mini-states such as Monaco or San Marino, Vatican City State is not a 
 
18 See George Weigel, God’s Choice: Pope Benedict XVI and the Future of the Catholic Church (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2005), 227, wherein this point also is made.  
19 Canon 361, Code of Canon Law (1983), in John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, 
(eds.), New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000), 475. 
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sovereign territorial entity, but a territorial possession or dependency of the Holy See 
itself.20 If it is not a nation state, by what right does the Holy See play its unique role in 
international relations?21  
B. PERMANENT SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
        The activity of the Pope in international affairs has its origins in the ancient 
Roman world and in the legal concept of agency. Indeed, one of the first instances of a 
papal legation occurred during the Council of Nicaea in the year 325.22 There, summoned 
by the Emperor Constantine, the Church held the first ecumenical council. At this council 
Pope Sylvester I was represented by his legates or papal agents, the Roman priests Vitus 
and Vicentius.23  
Throughout the early centuries of Christianity it became common practice for 
clergy to be dispatched from Rome in order to represent the Pope not only to the local 
churches, but also to the courts of temporal rulers. Later, it became common for the local 
churches and princes also to send their representatives to Rome. Both the representatives 
of the Holy See and the ambassadors of the princes were received as agents, ministers 
plenipotentiary, ready and able to conduct business on behalf of their principals.  
In medieval Europe political theorists used the idea of respublica christiana 
(Christian commonwealth, Christendom) to describe the international community of their 
time. This international community was headed by two powers, a spiritual and a temporal 
sovereign—Pope and Holy Roman Emperor.24 By the mid-fifteenth century need for 
more frequent contact arose between and among the European centers of power. 
Consequently, resident embassies were established at the principal courts of Europe. The 
 
20 The Vatican City State, however, does belong to the Universal Postal Union and other specialized 
international bodies in its own capacity, see Joseph L. Kunz, “The Status of the Holy See in International 
Law,” The American Journal of International Law 46, no. 2 (April 1952): 308-314, 313.  
21 For an authoritative Catholic answer to the question see Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, “The Unique 
Role of the Holy See in the International Community,” in Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to 
the United Nations, Paths to Peace: A Contribution: Documents of the Holy See to the International 
Community (New York: Liturgical Publications, 1987), xxvii-xxxvii.  
22 Vatican Information Service (VIS), “Vatican Diplomacy,” released via E-Mail 11 April 1997, 
online at http://www.catholic-pages.com/vatican/diplomacy.asp (accessed October 2005).  
23 Norman P. Tanner, S.J. (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume One, Nicaea I to 
Lateran V (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1-2. 
24 See Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300, reprint ed. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1988);  Kunz, “The Status of the Holy See in International Law,” 309. 
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Holy See established the first permanent apostolic nunciature (papal embassy) at Venice 
in 1500.25  
Shortly after the turn of the sixteenth century the medieval respublica christiana 
was mortally attacked. The spiritual and cultural unity of Europe, which already had 
begun to fragment through consolidation of royal power, collapsed completely in the 
wake of the Protestant Reformation. Curiously, the patterns and participants of the 
modern international system were already in place as nation states began to emerge from 
the medieval feudal order. The Roman Pontiff, the Holy Roman Emperor, kings, reigning 
dukes and princes, and the various city states of northern Italy and the empire were “the 
original members of our international community.”26  
By the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the single European Christian 
commonwealth had been undermined by more than a century of domestic strife, civil and 
international war, and religious intolerance. The diarchy of Pope and emperor had been 
supplanted by the devolution and evolution of sovereignty. Slogans like rex in regno suo 
est imperator (“the king is emperor in his own kingdom”) and cuius regio, eius religio 
(“whose realm, his religion”), provided, from the ancient Roman law, legal theories to 
match and defend the reality of emerging national sovereignty.27
The immediate consequence of the mid-seventeenth century settlements was the 
multiplication of states as sovereign entities and the expanding membership of the 
international community. The many states of the Holy Roman Empire were set free from 
imperial policy in religious and other matters. Increasingly, they were free to go their 
own way while the emperor’s authority was gradually restricted to the Habsburg lands of 
Austria and those outside the empire. Meanwhile, apart from the Papal States of central 
Italy, where he remained temporal sovereign, the Pope’s authority was reduced to that of 
a distant spiritual leader in Catholic states and excluded altogether from Protestant ones.  
Ultimately the façade of the old regime toppled altogether in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution. By 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved, its emperor recast as 
 
25 VIS, “Vatican Diplomacy.” 
26 Kunz, “The Status of the Holy See in International Law,” 309. 
27 See Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 
1961); Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 45-59. 
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a secular ruler of several realms and united only by the person of the Habsburg monarch. 
A single locus of temporal power in Europe ceased to exist until resurrected by the 
European projects of the late twentieth century, projects now notably embodied in the 
institutions of the Council of Europe and those of the European Union.  
In the Protocol of March 19, 1815, the Congress of Vienna confirmed the status of 
the Holy See, at that time the oldest continually existing agent of international diplomacy, 
as a “permanent subject of general customary international law vis-à-vis all states, 
Catholic or not.”28 This status of the Holy See was confirmed more recently through the 
United Nations in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted on April 14, 
1961, and which came into force on April 24, 1964.29
C.  THE HOLY SEE’S BILATERAL RELATIONS 
According to the Holy See’s website, the Holy See has full diplomatic relations 
with the European Communities and with most states, including the United States, almost 
all Arab and Islamic countries, Israel, and all former Soviet Republics except Russia. 
However, the Holy See does have “relations of a special nature” with the Russian 
Federation, a form of contact also maintained with respect to the Organization for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PLO).30  
Absent from the Holy See’s list of bilateral partners are the People’s Republic of 
China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. China refuses to enter into diplomatic relations 
with the Holy See; nonetheless, reflecting a readiness to engage, a papal mission to China 
is still maintained in Taipei. The Saudis do not allow religious freedom in the kingdom; 
however, contacts are available through the Holy See’s delegation to the Arab League at 
Cairo. Reflecting the activist foreign policy of John Paul II, the number of states now 
having full diplomatic relations with the Holy See is 174, an increase of 76 over the 98 
countries at the beginning of his pontificate.31  
 
28 Kunz, “The Status of the Holy See in International Law,” 310.  
29 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), art. 14, sec. 1, and art. 16, sec. 
3, online at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dipfra.htm (accessed October 2005). 
30 Data obtained from link off the Website of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the 
United Nations, online at http://www.holyseemission.org  (accessed October 2005).         
31 See George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2005), 845. 
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D.  THE HOLY SEE AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
The Holy See has participated in the United Nations since 1964. However, this 
participation has not been without controversy. As the only existing permanent observer 
non-member state, the Holy See has the right to participate without vote in the meetings 
of the General Assembly and the Security Council. It also has a right to participate fully 
in all international conferences and other meetings organized under UN auspices.32  
Because the Holy See’s status at the UN allows participation and access not 
available to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other religious bodies, attempts 
were made to end it in the aftermath of the UN Conference on Population and 
Development, held in Cairo in September 1994.33 Indeed, a campaign to end the Holy 
See’s non-member state status was launched publicly at the next UN conference, held at 
Beijing in September 1995. There, a petition seeking to relegate the Holy See to NGO 
status circulated at the Fourth World Conference on Women, receiving initially more 
than a thousand signatures.34 However, the effort gained no support from the 
governments of UN member states. On July 1, 2003, the member states of the UN 
General Assembly settled the matter by passing, apparently without opposition, a 
resolution reaffirming the permanent observer non-member state status of the Holy See.35
E. HOLY SEE DIPLOMACY 
 Typically the diplomatic activity of the Holy See is conducted through the 
Secretariat of State by diplomats known as apostolic nuncios. However, the case studies 
reported below involved the Pope personally, and for these interventions he sometimes 
involved personnel, institutions, and means not part of the normal diplomatic service. 
 
32 In recent years the only other permanent observer non-member state has been Switzerland, which 
became a member of the UN on September 12, 2002. 
33 For review of this conference and Pope John Paul II’s success in blocking adoption of a pro-
abortion agenda of the West, see C. Alison McIntosh and Jason L. Finkle, “The Cairo Conference on 
Population and Development,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 2 (June 1995): 223-260. For 
the late Pope’s views on population and development, see “Pope John Paul II on Human Rights and 
Population,” Population and Development Review 5, no. 4 (December 1979): 747-754 (excerpts from the 
Pope’s Address to the UN 34th General Assembly, October 2, 1979); “Pope John Paul II on Contemporary 
Development,” Population and Development Review 17, no. 3 (September 1991): 553-561 (excerpts from 
the Encyclical on the 100th Anniversary of Rerum Novarum, Centesimus Annus, (1901)). See also Pope 
Paul VI, Encyclical on the Development of Peoples, Populorum Progressio, (1967).     
34 See Yasmin Abdullah, “The Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church,” Columbia 
Law Review 96, no. 7 (November 1996): 1835-1875. 
35 UN General Assembly, Resolution 58/314, Fifty-eighth Session, Agenda item 59 (A/58/L.64), July 
1, 2003. 
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Consequently, this thesis does not consider the day-to-day diplomacy on behalf of the 
Holy See. The cases studied here are examples of the personal diplomacy of the Pope, 
directed not only to political leaders, but also to the entire Catholic Church as well as the 



















                                                
III. JOHN PAUL II AND THE IDEAS THAT SHAPED HIM  
A. A SNAP SHOT OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 
Karol Jozef Wojtyla was born May 18, 1920, in Wadowice, a Catholic town with 
a large Jewish minority in the newly formed Polish Republic. He was the third child and 
second son of a former non-commissioned officer of the Habsburg army who would 
retire from the Polish army in 1927 with the rank of captain.36 By 1938 Wojtyla was a 
university student in Kracow, the sole surviving child of the widowed father with whom 
he shared an apartment until the latter’s death in 1941. His student days were interrupted 
by the Nazi invasion in 1939, and he was forced to work as a manual labor. Under 
German occupation, Wojtyla secretly continued his study of the Polish theater and was a 
leader in an underground movement to preserve Polish culture, risking his life to take part 
in a theater of resistance.37 In 1942 he entered the underground seminary set up by the 
archbishop of Kracow in defiance of the occupation. If discovered, not at his place of 
work, but preparing for the Catholic priesthood, he faced death.38  
After the Second World War, Karol Wojtyla was ordained priest November 1, 
1946, and began a life of service to the Archdiocese of Kracow, now under Soviet 
domination. This life would take him to Rome for further studies in theology, to a small 
town parish, to completion of a second doctorate in philosophy, and ultimately back to 
Kracow. From there he spent his days doing pastoral work with university students and 
their families, teaching ethics in both Kracow and Lublin, and writing.39  
In 1958 Wojtyla was consecrated auxiliary bishop of Kracow, a position that gave 
him public responsibility vis-à-vis the communist government of Poland. In contrast to 
other religious communities within the Soviet bloc, the Catholic Church in Poland had 
 
36 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 24, 26-28.  
For other English biographies of the late Pope see Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, His Holiness: John 
Paul II and the History of Our Time (New York: Penguin Books, 1997); Ray Flynn, John Paul II: A 
Personal Portrait of the Pope and the Man (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2001); Garry O’Connor, 
Universal Father: A Life of John Paul II (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005); Tad Szulc, Pope John Paul II: 
The Biography (New York: Pocket Books, 1996, 2003). 
37 For Wojtyla’s love of the theater and the resistance theater see, Weigel, Witness to Hope, 35-38, 62-
66, 112-119. 
38 Ibid., 67-72. 
39 Ibid., 93-144. 
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retained the loyalty of most Poles as well as a good measure of institutional integrity, 
providing a national, cultural, and spiritual alternative to the uniformity of the state 
ideology. As auxiliary bishop, and later as archbishop of Kracow from 1964, Wojtyla 
exploited this integrity, using the space provided within the Church to maximize its 
significance and challenge the government through educational and pastoral programs 
aimed at empowering the Poles through their faith. Chief among these endeavors was the 
careful implementation, throughout the archdiocese of Kracow, of the decisions of the 
Second Vatican Council.40
In October 1978 the College of Cardinals gathered for a second time to elect a 
successor to Pope Paul VI who died on August 6. Their first choice had produced the 33 
day pontificate of John Paul I, ending with his death during the night of September 28-29. 
The second conclave chose a non-Italian, the first in 455 years. The Polish archbishop of 
Kracow, Cardinal Karol Wotyla, was elected October 16, taking the name John Paul II. 
He immediately upset Vatican protocol when he addressed the crowd gathered in Saint 
Peter’s Square in Italian. Using his own words, rather than simply imparting the 
traditional apostolic blessing in Latin, he won them over saying “I don’t know if I can 
make myself clear in your … our Italian language. If I make a mistake, you will correct 
me ….”41
Pope John Paul II died April 2, 2005, after serving more than 26 years as bishop 
of Rome, the third longest pontificate in history. Surviving an assassination attempt in 
1981, witnessing changes in the geopolitical structure of the world following the end of 
the Cold War, leading the Catholic Church through change and controversy, and making 
104 visits outside Italy, the late Pope produced a legacy that will take generations of 
research and thought to decode.42 Part of that legacy includes understanding John Paul’s 
appropriation of the Church’s social teaching, his own contributions to it, and the 




40 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 181-234. 
41 Quoted in Ibid., 256. 
42 For an early attempt at this effort see, Weigel, God’s Choice, 21-74. 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 
 By 1870 Europe and Western civilization had been long fractured by the demise 
of the respublica christiana (Christian commonwealth). Marked by the nationalization of 
sovereignty, the proliferation of nation states, and the secularization of politics, the 
leadership of the Catholic Church would slowly discover the benefits of having been 
forced to the margins of secular power.43 Return to pre-Constantinian conditions, when 
the Church played a purely moral and spiritual role in an often hostile political 
environment, was neither planned nor expected. Paradoxically, the new situation 
presented opportunities for the gradual emergence of a reformed, strengthened, and 
modern papacy, one having truly global reach and significance.44  
At the very moment the temporal power of the Pope was extinguished by the 
forces of the Italian risorgimento, Pope Pius IX had already succeeded in promulgating 
the decrees of the First Vatican Council (1869-1870). Therein, the First Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church of Christ defined for Catholic faith the primacy and 
infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. In defining the primacy, the Council solemnly affirmed 
the Pope’s universal jurisdiction over the whole Church as well as his immediate 
jurisdiction over all the local churches. By affirming papal infallibility the Council 
enhanced the Pope’s significance in the teaching of faith and morals.45  
With the Pope at the height of ecclesiastical power, response to the loss of the 
Papal States was reactionary. In the face of changed circumstances, Pius IX and his 
immediate successors considered themselves to be “prisoners of the Vatican.” This 
remained the case until Mussolini and Pope Pius XI agreed to the Lateran Treaty, 
establishing the Vatican City State in 1929.46 The development of modern Catholic social 
teaching and its application to politics and international relations starts from the middle 
years of this “imprisonment,” in the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903), the first 
successor to Pius IX. 
 
43 For a survey of how this effected development of church-state relations in Europe, see Rene 
Remond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
44 See Gene Burns, “The Politics of Ideology: The Papal Struggle with Liberalism,” The American 
Journal of Sociology 95, no. 5 (March 1990): 1123-1152. 
45 Norman P. Tanner, S.J. (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume Two, Trent to Vatican II 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 811-816. 
46 Burns, “The Politics of Ideology,” 1130, 1138.  
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1. Leo XIII and Rerum Novarum 
The most liberal and sustained strand of contemporary Catholic theology had its 
origins in one of the more theologically and politically conservative popes of modern 
times. He who championed the alliance of throne and altar, condemned the separation of 
church and state, and suppressed innovation by requiring Thomistic metaphysics and 
epistemology to be the only rational basis for Catholic scholarship, is considered today an 
innovator.47 Leo XIII is best remembered for the encyclical letter Rerum Novarum 
(1891), initiating therein what is now commonly referred to as modern Catholic “social 
doctrine” or “social teaching.”48
Catholic social teaching is a branch of moral theology, covering politics and 
economics insofar as these relate to the moral dimensions of human society. Because 
these disciplines require their own expertise, the Church’s teachings regarding these areas 
are not intended as precise policy prescriptions but given in order to specify the moral 
dimensions inherent in social life. Consequently, social teaching articulates moral 
principles that limit the exercise of political and economic power. These limits are 
believed necessary for safeguarding the innate value of human life.49  
Articulation of social teaching requires a first step, an analysis of actually existing 
societies. Consequently, the Catholic Church began its modern social teaching by 
recognizing an historical dimension in the analysis of moral issues, signaling later 
acceptance of the idea of the development of doctrine. As history unfolds, new situations 
shed light on the meaning of revelation, meaning undetected or not required in earlier 
 
47 See Burns, “The Politics of Ideology,” 1133-1134, for a brief summary of Leo XIII’s conservative 
tendencies. 
48 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical on Capital and Labor, Rerum Novarum (1891). Hereinafter, encyclicals 
and other papal documents will be cited according to this form.  
     As statements of Catholic teaching, papal encyclicals are the highest expression of the Pope’s 
magisterium (teaching office), ranking next to the documents of ecumenical councils in respect to their 
importance. Like documents of ecumenical councils, encyclicals sometimes restate matters of Catholic 
faith and morals already considered settled, even infallible. However, according to Catholic faith, the 
infallibility of the Pope’s teaching is never assumed from the type of document in which it is presented. It 
must be clear that the intention to teach infallibly is present, and stated in the most precise language. 
Consequently, the teaching of papal encyclicals is not considered infallible per se; however, such teaching 
is given due respect and never lightly dismissed. Whether an encyclical binds one’s conscience in matters 
of social teaching is a matter of theological controversy beyond the scope of this thesis. The difficulties 
associated with such a question are seen even in the realm of personal morals, as in the case of artificial 
means of contraception. See Pope Paul VI, Encyclical on the Regulation of Birth, Humane Vitae (1968).           
49 See Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., ed., “Introduction,” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching: 
Commentaries and Interpretations (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 1-6. 
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times. At the end of the nineteenth century the conditions of the new working classes 
presented a prime source for social disruption within societies marked by the industrial 
revolution. With this in mind, Pope Leo XIII chose to confront the political ideology of 
socialism by addressing the subjects of capital and labor. The encyclical Rerum Novarum 
is simultaneously a defense of private property and the rights of the working classes, duly 
noting the role of the state in regulating economic affairs and the limits of its authority to 
intervene in individual and associational rights.50  
For guidance in these matters, the Pope compared the inequalities and social 
dislocations of his day to the medieval past, to a world of guilds, charitable collectives, 
and greater direct involvement of the Church in alleviating poverty, providing education, 
and regulating economic life. However, Leo did not argue for restoration of the economic 
order of the old regime. In making the comparison, he noted the modern state had 
assumed roles previously played by the Church and other institutions no longer existing 
or no longer positioned to act effectively. A novelty appeared with respect to the 
individual within the state, prompting an emphasis on individual rights grounded in the 
biblical vision of the person made in the image of God.51 In the new circumstances of 
liberal capitalism challenged by socialism, individuals were left to fend for themselves 
and attracted by the idea of social revolution. Stressing economic justice, Rerum 
Novarum championed the rights of the worker, including the right to a just wage and the 
right to unionize. These rights correspond to the duties of the employer: “The following 
duties bind the wealthy owner and the employer: not to look upon their work people as 
their bondsmen, but to respect in every man his dignity as a person ennobled by Christian 
character.”52  
Leo did not confine recognition and protection of workers’ rights to the 
understanding and subjective decisions of employers, he made reference to the 
responsibility of the state to intervene on the workers’ behalf.  
 
50 Rerum Novarum.  
51 See Genesis 1: 27. 
52 Rerum Novarum, no. 20. Addressed to Catholic bishops and pastors, the encyclical’s reference to 
the ennobling effects of “Christian character” does not limit the duties of employers to Christian workers, 
but indicates Leo XIII was addressing only the Catholic community.  
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Rights must be religiously respected wherever they exist, and it is the duty 
of the public authority to prevent and punish injury, and to protect every 
one in the possession of his own. Still, when there is question of defending 
the rights of individuals, the poor and badly off have claim to special 
consideration.53  
Workers rights must receive protection in the juridical order. Here is the first 
foundation stone of modern Catholic social teaching—the dignity of the human person is 
the source of all individual human rights, rights that must be recognized and protected in 
the constitutional order of the state. 
Leo XIII’s two immediate successors were capable and pious men. Pius X paid 
most attention to reform within the Church. He was unoriginal in teaching the social 
doctrine of Leo XIII, and he retained the hostility of his predecessors to the modern world 
and its ideas. He was the last Pope to treat the loss of the Papal States as a disaster and 
the last whose election was interfered with by exercise of veto by a Catholic monarch.54 
In 1907 he condemned 65 propositions that he labeled “modernist” or “relativist” in the 
decree Lamentabile. Later, in his encyclical letter Pascendi Dominici Gregis, he 
condemned modernism as “the synthesis of all heresies.” One consequence of the 
condemnation was a requirement that all newly ordained priests and other Church 
officials swear an oath against modernism.55
2. Benedict XV and the First World War 
 Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) had the misfortune of being elected to the chair of 
Peter in September 1914, shortly after the beginning of the First World War. Prior to 
becoming archbishop of Bologna, he had served in the Holy See’s diplomatic service and 
for many years in the Secretariat of State. He used that experience to seek a Christmas 
cease fire in 1914. He did not succeed. However, he never gave up, and he involved the 
Holy See in wartime humanitarian activities. He called for peace many times during the 
course of the Great War, and he is remembered today for the “Papal Peace Note,” a 
 
53 Rerum Novarum, no 37. 
54 Robert John Araujo, S.J., and John A. Lucal, S.J., Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace: The 
Vatican and International Organization from the Early Years to the League of Nations (Naples, FL: 
Sapientia Press, 2004), 76.  
55 See Pope Pius X, Encyclical on the Doctrines of the Modernists, Pascendi Dominci Gregis (1907). 
The Oath against Modernism was in effect from 1910 until rescinded by Pope Paul VI in 1967. For text of 
the oath see, online at http://www.memorare.com/reform/oath.html (accessed December 2005).   
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seven-point peace proposal offered, rejected, and vilified in 1917.56 Benedict XV wrote 
no social encyclicals; nonetheless, he influenced the evolution of the Holy See’s 
international position through an activism not again seen until the pontificate of John 
XXIII.    
Italy entered the war in 1915 on the side of the Triple Entente. Annoyed by the 
neutrality of Benedict XV, the Italian government secured from the British an exclusion 
of the Holy See from any peace conference to end the war. This exclusion, marking the 
low point of the Holy See’s influence in the international community, was part of the 
secret Treaty of London.57 Rebuffed by the victorious powers, Benedict XV supported 
the League of Nations. Nonetheless, he ultimately thought it incapable of preserving the 
peace, most notably because of its purely secular foundation and its exclusiveness. He 
was particularly discouraged by the penal provisions imposed upon Germany and Austria 
by the victors of the First World War.58
Pope Benedict XV also was concerned about the reorganization of the Middle 
East brought about by the collapse and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of the Mandate system under British and French control. This concern was 
expressed with respect to the Holy Places of Palestine and the fate of Arab Christians in 
the new lands divided between the two major European victors of the war. Most troubling 
for Rome in this pre-ecumenical period of inter-church rivalry were Russian ambitions 
for extending dominion to Constantinople.59 These problems were overcome through 
British objection and the events of the Russian revolution.60 The emergence of a new 
Byzantine empire on the Bosporus was not to be; however, equally problematic for the 
Holy See, and the more enduring problem, was the British Mandate in Palestine.61  
 
56 See John F. Pollard, The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Pursuit of Peace (New 
York: Geoffrey Chapman, 2000), 123-128. The Papal Peace Note foreshadowed some of the provisions of 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points; however, Wilson’s rejection of the Peace Note, for its willingness to 
trust an undefeated Germany, led to the Note’s ultimate failure. 
57 Araujo and Lucal, Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace, 104-105 
58 See Ibid., 121, 150. 
59 “Ecumenism,” from which comes the adjective “ecumenical,” refers to the twentieth century 
movement to abandon inter-church rivalry and work for the co-operation and unity of all Christians.   
60 Pollard, The Unknown Pope, 196-198. 
61 See Araujo and Lucal, Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace, 161-190. 
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Two features of the British Mandate were directly opposed to the Holy See’s 
interests in the Middle East. The first was British policy regarding the terms under which 
the custody and control of the many Holy Places were to be divided and shared among 
the several Christian churches. The British policy was more favorable to the Eastern 
Orthodox Churches and open to enlargement of Protestant participation due to the 
interests of Britain’s own established Protestant churches. Secondly, the Holy See was 
opposed to the terms of the Balfour Declaration which, incorporated in the League of 
Nations mandates, opened Palestine to increased Jewish immigration, directly 
contradicting British commitment to Arab allies, including the Christian Arabs of the 
Holy Land. Fear that the Holy Land, its Holy Places, and Arab Christian communities 
would come under the exclusive control of Jewish interests shaped a dimension of the 
Holy See’s policies in Palestine well into the pontificate of John Paul II.62  
The Holy See’s preferred disposition for Palestine was one in which the territory 
would be granted its own international persona. A similar position was later incorporated 
in the UN’s decision to partition Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an 
international zone encompassing the most significant Holy Places in and around 
Jerusalem. The response of the Arab states to the establishment of the State of Israel in 
1948 and Israeli military successes in 1967 resulted in the Holy Places of the West Bank 
and Jerusalem coming under Israeli control. To this day the Holy See’s policy 
emphasizes an internationally guaranteed status for Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and 
the rights and spiritual interests of each of the three monotheistic faiths in the Holy 
Land.63     
The immediate post-war period provided some limited diplomatic successes for 
Benedict XV. He was able to reestablish diplomatic relations with France, severed since 
1905 because of Catholic opposition to the separation of church and state, and he initiated 
relations with many of the newly emerging states. After the war, the Pope’s wartime 
humanitarian activity and pursuit of peace would be applauded by the very people who 
 
62 Pollard, The Unknown Pope, 151. 
63 See Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Discorso di S.E. Mons. Jean-Louis Tauran sui Rapporti tra la 
Santa Sede e Gerusalemme, given at Jerusalem, October 26, 1998. 
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dismissed him because of his wartime neutrality. Over time, his wartime policy enhanced 
the Holy See’s international reputation and significance.64
3. Pius XI and the Principle of Subsidarity 
 With the election of Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) the Holy See began to distance 
itself for a time from the political activism of Benedict XV. However, Catholic social 
teaching continued to advance the thought begun by Leo XIII. Building upon Leo’s 
treatment of the associational rights of workers, Pius XI elaborated a universal principle 
of subsidiarity. This principle set forth the Catholic position on the value of “civil 
society” by limiting the important role of the state and stressing the way small groups and 
associations provide help (subsidium) to society.65  
In Quadragesimo Anno, the encyclical written for the fortieth anniversary of 
Rerum Novarum, Pius introduced the principle of subsidiarity by teaching that neither the 
individual nor the state thrive when the civil order leaves no intermediate institutions 
between these two poles of political life. Indeed, the institutions of family and civil 
society establish the conditions for the possibility of liberty and justice. The encyclical 
envisioned a thriving society built upon individuals freely coming together in pursuit of 
common interests, lightly regulated for the protection of the overall common good: 
As history abundantly proves, it is true that on account of changed 
conditions many things which were done by small associations in former 
times cannot be done now save by large associations. Still, that most 
weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed 
and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from 
individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry 
and give it to the community, so it is also an injustice and at the same time 
a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every 
social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of 
the body social, and never destroy and absorb them. 66
 
64 See Araujo and Lucal, Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace, 157-160. 
65 See Christine Firer Hinze, “Commentary on Quadragesimo Anno (After Forty Years),” in Modern 
Catholic Social Teaching, 151-174, 160-161. 
66 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical on the Reconstruction of the Social Order, Quadragesimo Anno (1931), 
no. 79. For theological-ethical analysis of the implications of the principle of subsidiarity, suggesting the 
priority of civil society over the state, and the similar conclusion drawn from secular academic research, 
see David Hollenbach, S.J., The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
100-103. See, e.g., Robert Putman, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
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Modern Catholic social teaching supports the idea of a limited role for government and 
the priority of individuals, families, and freely formed associations. The state exists only 
for the common good, in order to regulate and protect the preexisting ordering of human 
society. Through this teaching Pius XI condemned fascism, National Socialism, and 
communism.  
Some have faulted the pontificate of Pius XI for willingness to conclude a 
concordat with Hitler’s Third Reich. This arrangement, a bilateral treaty under the norms 
of international law, was signed and ratified in the summer of 1933, very early in Hitler’s 
regime. The Holy See’s desire for the concordat was motivated by memories of the 
Kutlurkampf when Bismarck attempted to reduce Catholic influence by restricting 
Catholic cultural expressions in German society. Therefore, the prime concern was 
protection for the liberties of the Catholic Church, especially in education. In return, the 
Church recognized Hitler’s government, surrendered the Church’s institutional 
participation in politics, and allowed the German bishops to swear an oath of loyalty to 
the Reich.67  
The Church discovered it surrendered too much, sacrificing legitimate rights to a 
regime that ignored all requirements of the principles of the common good. The Catholic 
Church lost a clear public moral voice. In return it received little protection for its 
institutional interests. Recognizing this, Pius XI issued his encyclical letter Mit 
Brennender Sorge, dated March 14, 1937, and smuggled it into Germany.68 There it was 
read from the pulpit in Catholic churches throughout the country. The encyclical 
denounced the totalitarian nature of the German Reich giving moral support to those 
Catholic prelates who had been the most public critics of the regime, especially Clemens 
 
67 See Robert A. Krieg, “The Vatican Concordat with Hitler’s Reich,” America, September 1, 2003, 
online at http://www.americamagazine.org/gettext.cfm?articleTypeID=1&textID=3131&issueID=448#  
(accessed December 2005). The 1933 Concordat was negotiated by Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope 
Pius XII), Secretary of State for the Holy See, and the German Vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen. Krieg 
notes that the concordat was flawed by the prevailing ecclesiology of the day, stressing the Church’s nature 
as a “perfect society” (having within itself all the means necessary to conduct its mission) while ignoring its 
responsibilities to society as a whole, including the duty to speak truth to power, even at the price of the 
Church’s institutional interests.  
68 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical on the Church and the German Reich, Mit Brennender Sorge (1937). 
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August von Galen, the bishop of Munster.69 However, this was too late to effectively 
challenge Hitler. Neither the encyclical nor other official statements of the Holy See 
during the Second World War gave effective condemnation of the anti-Semitic policies of 
the Third Reich even when the measures taken against the Jews were known by officials 
of the Holy See.70  
Recent critics have taken the opportunity to tar Pius XI’s Secretary of State, 
Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII), with anti-Semitism and, consequently, 
some responsibility for the Holocaust.71 The Holy See’s reluctance to denounce more 
clearly and consistently the anti-Semitic activities of the Nazi regime was influenced by 
concern for diplomatic neutrality, fear of subjecting the Church to total persecution in 
Germany and elsewhere, and, according to recent scholarship, belief that public 
condemnation might make things worse for the Jews.72  
Pius XI’s encyclical condemning communism, Divini Redemptoris, was published 
five days after the encyclical on the Church and the German Reich, Mit Brennender 
Sorge.73 Soviet communism had already been destroying humane religious and civic life 
in the Soviet Union, and had viciously persecuted the Catholic communities under its 
control. Of special concern were the Greek Catholic churches of the Ukraine, which had 
been dissolved and absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church saw 
communism as more threatening than Hitler’s Nazis, and this colored the Church’s 
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decisions regarding the Third Reich. Pius XI’s condemnation of communism was adopted 
by Pope Pius XII. It would influence the Holy See’s foreign policy through two decades 
of the Cold War. 
4. Pius XII and the Second World War 
Elected in March 1939, Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) was immediately involved in 
the crises that led to the Second World War. Shortly after the German armed forces 
invaded Poland, the new Pope published on October 20, 1939, the first encyclical of his 
pontificate, outlining his concerns for the international situation and the Church’s role in 
restoring peace.74 Summi Pontificatus was rooted in the regal Christology of the times 
and addressed the theme of “the Unity of Human Society.” Pius XII sought to summon 
Catholics and other Christians to obedience to the Gospel; however, he also attempted to 
address others through secondary use of the philosophical language of the natural law: 
The present age, Venerable Brethren, by adding new errors to the doctrinal 
aberrations of the past, has pushed these to extremes which lead inevitably 
to a drift towards chaos. Before all else, it is certain that the radical and 
ultimate cause of the evils which We deplore in modern society is the 
denial and rejection of a universal norm of morality as well for individual 
and social life as for international relations; We mean the disregard, so 
common nowadays, and the forgetfulness of the natural law itself, which 
has its foundation in God, Almighty Creator and Father of all, supreme 
and absolute Lawgiver, all-wise and just Judge of human actions.75
Pius XII diagnosed the “new errors,” naming two. He stated that “[t]he first of 
these pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that law of human 
solidarity and charity which is dictated and imposed by our common origin and by the 
equality of rational nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the 
redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the Altar of the Cross to His Heavenly 
Father on behalf of sinful mankind.”76 This error, opposed to the principle of solidarity, 
was detected in the extreme nationalist, racist, and class base ideologies of his time. As a 
counter, the Pope offered a vision of unity in the diversity of nations and peoples, and 
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pledged to promote native clergy and bishops in order to disconnect Christian 
evangelization from colonial enterprises.77
The second error addressed by Summi Pontificatus was the ideology of unlimited 
state power: 
But there is yet another error no less pernicious to the well-being of the 
nations and to the prosperity of that great human society which gathers 
together and embraces within its confines all races. It is the error 
contained in those ideas which do not hesitate to divorce civil authority 
from every kind of dependence upon the Supreme Being - First Source 
and absolute Master of man and of society - and from every restraint of a 
Higher Law derived from God as from its First Source. Thus they accord 
the civil authority an unrestricted field of action that is at the mercy of the 
changeful tide of human will, or of the dictates of casual historical claims, 
and of the interests of a few.78
Pius believed that when states are unrestrained by higher authority the entire basis of the 
international order is undermined, and war made inevitable. In this analysis, the Pope was 
anticipating the subordination of state sovereignty to the principles of international law. 
In his day, this was an idea resting on trust that governments would adhere to their treaty 
obligations. Implicit in his analysis, however, was an idea of international law having its 
foundation in universal moral principles. Consequently, Pius XII condemned not only the 
breach of treaty obligations but also the unjust and unequal treaties imposed on the 
vanquished through victory in war.79 Throughout the pontificate of Pius XII, the themes 
of the encyclical would reappear, guiding an approach to world politics and repeated 
attention to the affairs of the Middle East and Eastern Europe.80 In the Middle East his 
concern was that the boundaries of states not be determined by the outcome of war. In 
Eastern Europe he was making plain his alliance with the West against the ambitions of 
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Soviet communism, condemning the persecution of religion and the enslavement of 
whole societies. 
5. John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council 
Following the death of Pius XII in 1958, the social teaching of the Catholic 
Church developed at an unprecedented pace. Crucial to this development was Angelo 
Giuseppe Roncalli, patriarch of Venice, who became Pope John XXIII (1958-1963). Prior 
to serving in Venice, Roncalli had been a military chaplain in the First World War and a 
career diplomat for the Holy See. He served in Bulgaria (1925-1934) and personally 
witnessed the Second World War from postings in Turkey, Greece (1934-1944), and 
France (1944-1953), gaining ecumenical, inter-faith, and UNESCO experience and 
working to relieve the sufferings caused by the war.81 Influenced by these experiences 
Pope John was well suited to undertake the task he set for himself as Pope, the 
introduction of the Catholic Church to the modern world and its challenges. His 
encyclicals, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, and the convening of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965) are his lasting contributions to the task of updating the 
Church.82  
John XXIII’s major encyclical, Pacem in Terris, was published in spring 1963, 
after the first session of the Second Vatican Council and following John XXIII’s 
encounter with American and Soviet leaders during the previous October. At that time he 
contributed to resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis by responding to signals from both 
sides welcoming his intervention.83 This encounter prompted him to speak to the “signs 
of the times” on his own authority and while the Council was in adjournment. Pacem in 
Terris was addressed not only to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church but “to all men of 
good will.”84 Consequently, the language of the document was philosophical rather than 
theological, reasoned discourse in the natural law tradition. The encyclical was a 
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synthesis of the social teaching of all the popes since Leo XIII, but its audience was a 
modern world in need of hope, not another utopian ideology. Pope John based individual 
and political life in the dignity of the human person, emphasizing both rights and duties 
and the proper ordering of the state.85 He stressed the equality of persons and nations 
within the worldwide human family.86 However, he recognized that the actual state of 
international relations, based on the balance of power among sovereign states, never had 
more than a few powers at the helm. Consequently, the danger posed by the Cold War 
and the nuclear arms race encompassed the whole world in the bi-polar contest. To 
remedy the existing state, the Pope proposed an agenda of universal human rights and 
effective international political institutions, recognizing the UN and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as positive signs of the times.87 To this end the encyclical 
stated,  
It is therefore Our earnest wish that the United Nations Organization may 
be able progressively to adapt its structure and methods of operation to the 
magnitude and nobility of its tasks. May the day be not long delayed when 
every human being can find in this organization an effective safeguard of 
his personal rights; those rights, that is, which derive directly from his 
dignity as a human person, and which are therefore universal, inviolable 
and inalienable. This is all the more desirable in that men today are taking 
an ever more active part in the public life of their own nations, and in 
doing so they are showing an increased interest in the affairs of all 
peoples. They are becoming more and more conscious of being living 
members of the universal family of mankind.88
During the last year of John XXIII’s pontificate the Holy See initiated its own 
Ostpolitik, an early form of détente.89 Vatican officials took the first steps toward 
dialogue with the governments of the Soviet bloc, abandoning the purely anti-Soviet 
policies championed by Pius XII and following the logic of Pope John’s encyclical: 
Again it is perfectly legitimate to make a clear distinction between a false 
philosophy of the nature, origin and purpose of men and the world, and 
economic, social, cultural, and political undertakings, even when such 
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undertakings draw their origin and inspiration from that philosophy. True, 
the philosophic formula does not change once it has been set down in 
precise terms, but the undertakings clearly cannot avoid being influenced 
to a certain extent by the changing conditions in which they have to 
operate. Besides, who can deny the possible existence of good and 
commendable elements in these undertakings, elements which do indeed 
conform to the dictates of right reason, and are an expression of man's 
lawful aspirations?90  
The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Guadium et Spes, 
and the Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae, were promulgated on 
December 7, 1965, the next to last day of the Second Vatican Council.91 Guadium et Spes 
formulated a role for the Church in the promotion of human rights and launched a new 
agenda for peace and justice ministries throughout the Catholic world. In the field of 
international relations, the document stated a duty for the Church and all nations to work 
toward establishing an effective world authority for the prevention of war: 
It is our clear duty to spare no effort to achieve the complete outlawing of 
war by international agreement. This goal, of course, requires the 
establishment of a universally acknowledged public authority vested with 
the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and 
respect for law.92
 With respect to the use of force, the Council followed the just war tradition, 
limiting the use of force to last resort and legitimate self-defense, restraining that use to 
proportionate means, and carefully assuring the immunity of non-combatants.93 Within 
these limits, “[a]ll those who enter the military service in loyalty to their country should 
look upon themselves as the custodians of the security and freedom of their people; and 
when they carry out their duty properly, they are contributing to the maintenance of 
peace.”94
Dignitatis Humanae brought about a fundamental shift in Catholic moral 
theology. The document addressed the subject of religious liberty and placed the Church 
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irrevocably on the side of the human rights movement. Before the Council, the common 
Catholic teaching held that one could only claim a right to adhere to the true religion. The 
accepted thesis required Catholic political authorities to establish the Catholic faith as the 
state religion wherever it was possible, allowing only private adherence to other beliefs. 
However, the events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had forced the Church to 
accommodate to secular toleration. Consequently, Catholic moral theology developed a 
synthesis position. The synthesis permitted toleration of religious diversity as a matter of 
prudence required by the common good. Under this thesis-synthesis approach, a right to 
religious liberty was, strictly speaking, impossible, for “error has no rights.”95
Armed with the experience of the Catholic Church in the United States, where the 
traditions of a secular state were not hostile to religion, the American bishops and others 
challenged the status quo. With the assistance of Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray, 
they managed a reassessment of the thesis-synthesis position and presented an argument 
based not on the abstract opposition of truth and error, but on an analysis of what was 
required by the dignity of the human person.96 This position prevailed: 
The council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on 
the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word 
of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious 
freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of 
society as will make it a civil right ….  
… the right to religious freedom is based not on subjective attitude but on 
the very nature of the individual person. For this reason, the right to such 
immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their 
obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it. The exercise of this right 
cannot be interfered with as long as the just requirements of public order 
are observed.97
 The Council could not have discussed coherently the issue of religious liberty if it 
had not also taken up three issues of a purely theological nature. These dealt with intra-
church, ecumenical, and interfaith matters. The Decree on the Catholic Eastern Churches,  
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Orientalium Ecclesiarum, addressed the long neglected status of the majority of Catholics 
living in the Middle East and in certain parts of Eastern Europe.98 In this document the 
Council made clear that the hierarchies and faithful of the twenty-one Eastern Catholic 
churches have the right and responsibility of restoring, preserving, and organically 
developing the ancient rites, privileges, and disciplines pertaining to their own traditions. 
This measure was corrective of a long history of Westernizing influences and the 
suppression of oriental traditions by overzealous members of the Latin Church.99  
The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio, inaugurated the Catholic 
Church’s participation in the ecumenical movement, charting a new course of dialogue 
and cooperation with the Orthodox churches of the East and the Protestant communities 
derived from the Reformation.100 Here the Council rooted ecumenism in a theological 
vision that seeks Christian unity through serious dialogue and efforts toward full visible 
communion of all Christians. The hallmark of Catholic ecumenism is that it enshrines the 
ecumenical project as a necessary and permanent commitment of the Church, not a mere 
policy preference. Underlying the commitment is recognition of an invisible bond 
existing already among all the followers of Jesus by virtue of common faith in Christ and 
his baptism.  
The Council was not content with Catholics fostering dialogue and new 
relationships only with other Christians. In the Declaration on the Relation of the Church 
to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, a desire for shared understanding and 
solidarity with all the world’s religious traditions was announced.101 Addressing non-
Christian religions in general, the Council noted that the Catholic Church “rejects nothing 
of what is true and holy in these religions,” while defending the Church’s duty to 
proclaim Christ.”102 However, the most significant dimensions of the document pertain to 
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Jews and Muslims, who are, with Christians, witnesses to monotheism and, in various 
ways, bearers of the faith of Abraham.  
Regarding the Jewish faith, the document noted the “common spiritual heritage” 
that links Christianity with Judaism and reversed centuries of Christian prejudice. 
Through Nostra Aetate, the Church, reflecting on the Holocaust, definitively denounced 
any continuing attribution of the death of Christ to the Jewish people, and reproved “all 
hatreds, persecutions, [and] displays of anti-semitism leveled at any time and from any 
source against the Jews.”103 This document would provide the basis for a renewed 
Jewish-Christian dialogue, resumed after nineteenth centuries of harsh division.104  
In commenting on Islam the Council stated:  
The church has also a high regard for the Muslims. They worship God, 
who is one, living and subsistent, merciful and almighty, the Creator of 
heaven and earth, who has also spoken to humanity. They endeavor to 
submit themselves without reserve to the hidden decrees of God, just as 
Abraham submitted himself to God’s plan, to whose faith Muslims eagerly 
link their own. Although not acknowledging him as God, they venerate 
Jesus as a prophet; his virgin Mother they also honor, and even at times 
devoutly invoke. Further, they await the day of judgment and the reward 
of God following the resurrection of the dead. For this reason they highly 
esteem an upright life and worship God, especially by way of prayer, 
alms-giving and fasting.105
On the basis of these similarities and differences, the Council offered dialogue with Islam 
and cooperation in the moral and political spheres. 
6. Paul VI: Pope of Dialogue 
It fell to Pope Paul VI (1963-1978) to complete the work of the Second Vatican 
Council and to promulgate its decrees. However, his pontificate also inaugurated the 
Holy See’s participation in the United Nations. On October 4, 1965, he addressed the UN 
General Assembly in New York, stating,          
There is no need for a long talk to proclaim the main purpose of your 
institution. It is enough to recall that the blood of millions, countless 
unheard-of sufferings, useless massacres and frightening ruins have 
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sanctioned the agreement that unites you with an oath that ought to change 
the future history of the world: never again war, never again war! It is 
peace, peace, that has to guide the destiny of the nations of all mankind.106  
With this emphasis, Paul VI devoted his papacy to all the nations, becoming the first 
Pope in modern times to travel outside Italy in order to deliver his message. With these 
travels he prefigured John Paul II, who would make the pastoral visit the hallmark of his 
public diplomacy. Through seven pilgrimages to all the continents, Paul VI visited 
Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, India, the United States, Portugal, Turkey, Bermuda, Columbia, 
Uganda, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Australia, West Samoa, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, and Iran. In each place he met with government officials, religious authorities, 
and ordinary people. In six of these countries the majority of the population was Muslim; 
in four others Muslims constituted significant minorities. During the 1964 visit to the 
Holy Land, however, he refrained from mentioning the name of the State of Israel, 
keeping with the Holy See’s diplomatic posture of the time. 
Two documents stand out in reference to Paul VI’s personal contributions to 
Catholic social teaching, the encyclical, Populorum Progressio, and the apostolic letter, 
Octogesima Adveniens.107 Paul VI had institutionalized and augmented the policy of 
Ostpolitik begun in the last days of his predecessor, but in Populorum Progressio he 
shifted the focus away from the East-West division and addressed the effects of the Cold 
War, neo-colonialism, and unbridled global free trade on the developing nations.108 He 
emphasized the call to dialogue made in his first encyclical, Ecclesiam Suam.109 On the 
one hand, he highlighted the North-South dialogue, insisting that the wealthier nations of 
the world recognize and assume a duty to the poorer ones:  
This duty concerns first and foremost the wealthier nations. Their 
obligations stem from the human and supernatural brotherhood of man, 
and present a three-fold obligation: 1) mutual solidarity—the aid that the 
richer nations must give to developing nations; 2) social justice—the 
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rectification of trade relations between strong and weak nations; 3) 
universal charity—the effort to build a more humane world community, 
where all can give and receive, and where the progress of some is not 
bought at the expense of others. The matter is urgent, for on it depends the 
future of world civilization.110
On the other hand, Paul VI encouraged local initiatives and supported grass roots efforts 
to address economic and social problems according to principles first taught by the 
Belgian priest, Cardinal Joseph Cardjin—“observe, judge, act.” This method had been 
supported by John XXIII, but now it was used to give priority to reflection by the local 
Christian community. As noted by a recent analysis, “The pope dared to suggest that 
Catholic social teaching could only emerge out of specific, regionally situated dialogue 
with specific concerns.”111 This suggestion, along with the work of the Latin American 
bishops at Medellin in 1968 and the Synod of Bishops in 1971, gave support to the 
theology of liberation that would face criticism for its Marxist stress on class conflict 
under John Paul II.112
Octogesima Adveniens brought about another shift in papal social teaching by 
focusing specifically on the use of political power, calling for discernment of new ways 
to assure participation based upon the inherent dignity of the person.113 For Paul VI, 
participation implied some form of democracy, something absent from countries under 
communist systems. However, the mere transfer of the West’s liberal democratic system 
to the diverse nations and peoples of the world was also called into question, as its 
application failed to do justice to the needs of the poor, the dispossessed, and society 
itself.  
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Therefore the Christian who wishes to live his faith in a political activity 
which he thinks of as service cannot without contradicting himself adhere 
to ideological systems which radically or substantially go against his faith 
and his concept of man. He cannot adhere to the Marxist ideology, to its 
atheistic materialism, to its dialectic of violence and to the way it absorbs 
individual freedom in the collectivity, at the same time denying all 
transcendence to man and his personal and collective history; nor can be 
adhere to the liberal ideology which believes it exalts individual freedom 
by withdrawing it from every limitation, by stimulating it through 
exclusive seeking of interest and power, and by considering social 
solidarities as more or less automatic consequences of individual 
initiatives, not as an aim and a major criterion of the value of the social 
organization.114   
Paul VI called for new approaches. For the first time a pope allowed cooperation with 
those committed to socialism, provided they were removed from the atheism, 
materialism, and utopian ideals of socialism’s ideological formulation.115 Commitment to 
the poor may never be an excuse for class struggle, denial of individual liberties, or the 
subordination of all life to politics. In the final analysis, politics must allow participation 
by all for the common good, but it cannot infringe on the rights of the individual. The 
shape of politics in each instance should reflect the diversity of peoples and cultures.  
In concrete situations, and taking account of solidarity in each person's 
life, one must recognize a legitimate variety of possible options. The same 
Christian faith can lead to different commitments. The Church invites all 
Christians to take up a double task of inspiring and of innovating, in order 
to make structures evolve, so as to adapt them to the real needs of today. 
From Christians who at first sight seem to be in opposition, as a result of 
starting from differing options, she asks an effort at mutual understanding 
of the other's positions and motives; a loyal examination of one's behavior 
and its correctness will suggest to each one an attitude of more profound 
charity which, while recognizing the differences, believes nonetheless in 
the possibility of convergence and unity. "The bonds which unite the 
faithful are mightier than anything which divides them." 116  
7. John Paul II: Human Dignity and Global Solidarity 
When Pope John Paul II assumed the papacy in 1978, he inherited a tradition of 
Catholic social teaching that he appropriated and adapted to the new realties of his time. 
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Reading the first encyclical of his pontificate as a mission statement, one finds a 
Christian humanism that informs the whole of his pontificate.117 The late Pope’s 
contributions can only be understood in light of his core belief that the truth of every 
human life is revealed in the mystery of Christ, “Human nature, by the very fact that it 
was assumed, not absorbed, in him [Christ], has been raised in us also to a dignity beyond 
compare.”118 From this tenet of Christian faith, John Paul II elevated human rights to 
fundamental importance in the conduct of foreign policy. In his view, this was the 
necessary consequence of the high dignity of the human person. 
The practical implications of this belief were first seen in his reversal of the Holy 
See’s Ostpolitik, manifested by a blunt defense of religious freedom behind the iron 
curtain. Believing that truth could confront power and prevail, he abandoned the delicate 
realism through which his predecessors and Vatican diplomats had engaged the Soviet 
bloc. He insisted on the full agenda of human rights.119 Not long after his election, he 
participated in events that would contribute to the formation of the Solidarity movement 
in Poland. Beginning with the first papal pilgrimage to Poland, June 2-10, 1979, and 
continuing with later pilgrimages in 1983 and 1987, the Pope’s presence among his 
countrymen and his support for realization of their liberties encouraged freedom within 
both the Church and a growing civil society. From these cultural communities a direct 
rebuke to the lies of communism would emerge. In time, the power of this rebuke would 
spread, and, combined with other factors, yield the successful non-violent challenge to 
the communist regime of Poland. Yale University historian John Lewis Gaddis goes 
further, recently writing, “When John Paul II kissed the ground at the Warsaw airport on 
June 2, 1979, he began the process by which communism in Poland—and ultimately 
everywhere else in Europe—would come to an end.”120   
 
117 See Pope John Paul II, Encyclical at the Beginning of His Papal Ministry, Redemptor Hominis 
(1979), no. 1. 
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119 See Weigel, Witness to Hope, 295-299.  
120 Gaddis, The Cold War, 193. Gaddis compares John Paul II with Ronald Reagan, both confronting 
the “evil empire” with the conviction of their ideas and the skill of actors. Ibid., 217. Of course, President 
Reagan had the economic and military power of the United States to back him. In the end, the use of force 
was unnecessary. Gorbachev refused to crush the revolutions within the Soviet bloc, but why? Gaddis says 
that, in the end, “He chose love over fear ….” Ibid., 257.    
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In 1987, before the collapse of the Soviet bloc, John Paul published Solicitudo Rei 
Socialis, an encyclical that critiqued the failure of both superpowers to promote peace 
and contribute to the proper development of the Third World.121 Noting the lack of 
substantial progress since Paul VI called attention to the problem of development, John 
Paul wrote: 
In the light of these considerations, we easily arrive at a clearer picture of 
the last twenty years and a better understanding of the conflicts in the 
northern hemisphere, namely between East and West, as an important 
cause of the retardation or stagnation of the South. 
The developing countries, instead of becoming autonomous nations 
concerned with their own progress towards a just sharing in the goods and 
services meant for all, become parts of a machine, cogs on a gigantic 
wheel. This is often true also in the field of social communications, which, 
being run by centers mostly in the northern hemisphere, do not always 
give due consideration to the priorities and problems of such countries or 
respect their cultural make-up. They frequently impose a distorted vision 
of life and of man and thus fail to respond to the demands of true 
development. 
Each of the two blocs harbors in its own way a tendency towards 
imperialism, as it is usually called, or towards forms of new-colonialism: 
an easy temptation to which they frequently succumb, as history, including 
recent history, teaches.122
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Sollicitudo Rei Socialis drew criticism from certain conservative and neo-
conservative voices in the United States and other parts of the West. They claimed the 
Pope had drawn a moral equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States.123 
There was also criticism from the left, claiming the Pope had abandoned the emphasis 
that Paul VI had placed on local initiative in favor of a centralized grand vision presented 
as moral exhortation rather than critical analysis.124 Whatever the shortcomings, John 
Paul’s challenge was premised upon a view of international politics seen from the 
perspective of the developing world, from the North-South axis, rather than the East-
West axis so important to the bi-polar world of the Cold War. The Pope was siding with 
the South, insisting that the developing nations be allowed and assume a place of equal 
importance in international relations.125 Before the Cold War ended, John Paul II was 
insisting on a new world order, calling upon both East and West to cease involving the 
rest of the world in the ideological battle between communism and liberal capitalism. To 
replace the battle, he prescribed what had already been the watchword of his 
interventions in Poland, and the name of the movement that would break the Soviet bloc 
in 1989. He prescribed global solidarity, the moral requirement of the unity of the human 
family: 
It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system 
determining relationships in the contemporary world, in its economic, 
cultural, political and religious elements, and accepted as a moral 
category. When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the 
correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a "virtue," is 
solidarity. This then is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow 
distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the 
contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to 
the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, 
because we are all really responsible for all.126
Following the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the “Soviet bloc,” 
John Paul reflected on these events in the encyclical Centesimus Annus, published in 
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celebration of the centenary of Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum.127 In this document he 
restated the need for solidarity, insisting that it had been an essential element of modern 
Catholic social teaching from the beginning: 
In this way what we nowadays call the principle of solidarity, the validity 
of which both in the internal order of each nation and in the international 
order I have discussed in the Encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis, is clearly 
seen to be one of the fundamental principles of the Christian view of 
social and political organization. This principle is frequently stated by 
Pope Leo XIII, who uses the term "friendship", a concept already found in 
Greek philosophy. Pope Pius XI refers to it with the equally meaningful 
term "social charity". Pope Paul VI, expanding the concept to cover the 
many modern aspects of the social question, speaks of a "civilization of 
love."128
The Pope believed that solidarity among the workers of Poland, their rejection of class 
struggle in favor of non-violent protest, had successfully highlighted the priority of 
culture over politics as well as the economic and spiritual bankruptcy of Marxism. With 
the support of the Church, these factors led to a dialogue with the state authorities and 
resulted in the peaceful settlement.129  
As if answering the conservative critics of Sollictudo Rei Socialis, John Paul gave 
qualified support to the political and economic systems of the West, approving both 
democracy and free markets and calling for “a society of free work, of enterprise and of 
participation” over a system of “State capitalism.”130 However, neither democracy nor 
market economics would serve the common good unless they were constrained by a rule 
of law grounded in universal moral principles and particularly concerned with the needs 
of the poor.131  
The Pope did not hesitate to note new problems in the new world order, 
highlighting the need for continuing attention to development, both in Eastern Europe 
and the Southern Hemisphere, and linking the lack of development to the failure of the 
international community to find peaceful means to prevent the “recent tragic war in the 
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Persian Gulf.”132 Moreover, he stressed the dangers of fanaticism and religious 
fundamentalism: 
Nor does the Church close her eyes to the danger of fanaticism or 
fundamentalism among those who, in the name of an ideology which 
purports to be scientific or religious, claim the right to impose on others 
their own concept of what is true and good. Christian truth is not of this 
kind. Since it is not an ideology, the Christian faith does not presume to 
imprison changing socio-political realities in a rigid schema, and it 
recognizes that human life is realized in history in conditions that are 
diverse and imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming the 
transcendent dignity of the person, the Church's method is always that of 
respect for freedom.133
Centesimus Annus was John Paul II’s last encyclical addressing specifically the 
moral dimensions of political and economic life. The document crowned an extensive 
papal contribution to modern Catholic social teaching. However, this last social 
encyclical came at the time the events presented in the next chapter were beginning to 
take shape. The aftermath of the Cold War and the first Gulf War had only recently 
illuminated new challenges and opportunities. In presenting the case studies, the intent is 
to show how these new developments, assessed in the light of the Church’s social 
teaching, shaped recent practical interventions of the Holy See in the Middle East. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the one hundred year movement from Leo XIII to 
John Paul II reveals a certain trajectory—from resistance to political change to an 
embrace of the autonomy of politics: 
The Church respects the legitimate autonomy of the democratic order and 
is not entitled to express preferences for this or that institutional or 
constitutional solution. Her contribution to the political order is precisely 
her vision of the dignity of the person revealed in all its fullness in the 
mystery of the Incarnate Word.134
The dignity of the human person and commitment to the principle of solidarity are the 
foundation of the Church’s social teaching. From this foundation, the Holy See’s role in 
the international community had been reformed and refocused through the changing 
circumstances of recent history. 
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IV. JOHN PAUL II: HIS DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 Pope John Paul II was focused on the Middle East from the beginning of his 
pontificate. Evidence of his concern was prominent in an address to the UN General 
Assembly on October 2, 1979: 
It is my fervent hope that a solution also to the Middle East crises may 
draw nearer. While being prepared to recognize the value of any concrete 
step or attempt made to settle the conflict, I want to recall that it would 
have no value if it did not truly represent the “first stone” of a general 
overall peace in the area, a peace that, being necessarily based on 
equitable recognition of the rights of all, cannot fail to include the 
consideration and just settlement of the Palestinian question. Connected 
with this question is that of the tranquility, independence and territorial 
integrity of Lebanon within the formula that has made it an example of 
peaceful and mutually fruitful coexistence between distinct communities, 
a formula that I hope will, in the common interest, be maintained, with the 
adjustments required by the developments of the situation. I also hope for 
a special statute that, under international guarantees–as my predecessor 
Paul VI indicated–would respect the particular nature of Jerusalem, a 
heritage sacred to the veneration of millions of believers of the three great 
monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.135
He spoke of “the Middle East crises,” showing awareness of a plurality of issues facing 
the region. He referred to the “rights of all,” the “Palestinian question,” the “integrity of 
Lebanon,” a “special statute” for Jerusalem, and the Holy City’s sacred heritage for Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims. In keeping with the Holy See’s diplomatic posture, he did not 
mention Israel. 
On November 12, 1979, forty-one days after the UN address, the Pope received a 
reply to his plea for release of the Americans held hostage in the United States embassy 
in Tehran. The leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in an 
address to Archbishop Annibale Bugnini, Apostolic Pro Nuncio to Iran, refused the 
Pope’s request. Instead, he suggested John Paul would make better use of his time “by 
giving all the superpowers fatherly advice or by summoning them to account for their 
 
135 Pope John  Paul II, Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Thirty-fourth General Assembly of 
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deeds.”136 The coincidence of the election of Pope John Paul II with Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution highlights the resurgence of religion as a political force in the final decades of 
the Twentieth Century.137
The following case studies concern the late Pope’s diplomacy in the Middle East. 
In looking at the Holy See’s interventions in Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq, a comparison 
between contemporary Catholic social teaching and that of resurgent Islam should be 
kept in mind. However, as the development traced in Chapter III reveals, it was not long 
ago that official teaching sanctioned establishing a Catholic political order wherever 
possible. It was only forty years ago that the Catholic Church fully acknowledged the 
legitimacy of the secular state and the human right to freedom of religion and conscience. 
That was the achievement of Dignitatis Humanae, the Second Vatican Council’s 
Declaration on Religious Liberty. 
A. ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL 
Yona Metzger, one of the two chief rabbis of Israel, relates the following story of 
a conversation between Theodore Herzl and Pope Pius X:  
The conversation held between Theodore Herzl, founder of the Zionist 
movement, and Pope Pius X not long before Herzl’s death in 1904 gives 
some evidence of where we used to be. Herzl came to Pius seeking 
support for his vision of re-establishment of Jewish independence in the 
Land of Israel. The pope’s response was far from supportive. According to 
Herzl, Pius stated the “the Jews have not recognized our Lord; therefore, 
we cannot recognize the Jewish people. Thus while we cannot prevent the 
Jews from going to Jerusalem, we could never sanction it.”138
Whatever was said during the Herzl-Pius conversation, it is evident that the Holy See 
opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine after the First World War, opposed the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948, and has resisted exclusive Jewish control of Jerusalem to 
this day. 
As noted in the introduction, the Holy See’s resistance to Jewish settlement in 
Palestine and refusal to establish diplomatic relations with the State of Israel were first 
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the reflection of the Holy See’s desire to protect the Catholic Church’s own ecclesial 
interests. Later the policy was justified as support for Christians in their struggle to 
maintain a presence in the Holy Land.139 Because almost all these Christians were Arabs, 
the Holy See’s policies had an express preference for the Palestinian cause. In these 
circumstances diplomatic recognition of Israel was considered off the table. 
As George Irani demonstrated, the Holy See’s position vis-à-vis Israel had 
evolved in response to doctrinal development, changes on the ground, and the failure of 
settlement in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.140 By 1984, the sixth year of 
the pontificate of John Paul II, the Holy See had been forced, by the logic of the Church’s 
own teaching and the reality of politics, to reformulate its own interests. Having begun 
dialogue with non-Christian religions, recognized the imperative of improved relations 
with Jews and Muslims, set out on the ecumenical path with non-Catholic Christians, and 
embraced the full agenda of human rights, much more was at stake in the Holy Land than 
the rights and privileges of the Catholic Church. These purely ecclesial interests had been 
subordinated to a broader vision that saw the Church’s true interests as encompassing 
three priorities in the Middle East: (1) protection of the welfare of Christian minorities; 
(2) promotion of peaceful coexistence; and (3) winning respect for the human rights of 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims.141 These priorities have particular significance with 
respect to the status of Jerusalem. However, despite the broader vision of its interests, the 
Holy See would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel until 1993. 
All theological objections to Catholic recognition of the “Jewish people” were 
abandoned and suppressed by the Second Vatican Council in the document Nostra 
Aetate. By the mid-1980s there were also no other principled reasons for the Holy See to 
remain diplomatically estranged from the State of Israel. In 1983, the then under 
secretary of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, noted: 
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The Holy See recognizes the factual existence of Israel, its right to exist, 
its right to secure borders and to all other rights that a sovereign nation 
possesses. The Holy See would have no problem in principle with 
establishing diplomatic relations. However, there are certain difficulties 
and problems that the Holy See would first want to have resolved. I might 
add that it is the common custom of the Holy See not to be the initiator of 
diplomatic relations with any country, although it welcomes and 
appreciates diplomatic relations.142
The “difficulties and problems” were several. According to Irani they included: (1) 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982; (2) continuing Jewish settlement in the occupied 
territories; (3) the fate of Palestinians, both refugees and those in the occupied territories; 
(4) the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places; (5) Israel’s lack of recognized borders; 
(6) the views of Arab Christians (Catholics and others); and (7) Israel’s regulation of 
Catholic teaching and presence, a matter of concern to Jews worried about Christian 
missionary activities.143  
In his biography of John Paul II, George Weigel argues that the Holy See’s 
successful conclusion of diplomatic relations with Israel was simply the result of the 
Pope’s decision.144 According to Weigel, the decision resulted from a combination of the 
need to defend the Church’s historic interests in the Holy Land and the Pope’s “intuition 
of Jewish pain and his theological commitment to getting the long-delayed theological 
dialogue between Jews and Christians under way again.”145 Weigel is correct to note 
John Paul’s personal role in the matter. Indeed, only a Pope deeply influenced by 
experience, personal friendships with Jews since childhood, and common struggle against 
the Nazis, would have the intuition and commitment necessary to drive the policy 
change.146 For John Paul, the matter was a necessary Christian response to the Holocaust 
and the logical fruit of Nostra Aetate—experience and doctrine had moral consequences. 
The Pope was seeking ways to promote the dignity of the human person and deepen the 
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Catholic Church’s solidarity with the international Jewish community. However, that 
community did not appreciate the gap between the Church’s desire to improve relations 
with Judaism and the Holy See’s continuing policy of distancing itself from the Jewish 
state. 
The better view is that the Pope’s role was necessary, but not sufficient. His desire 
did not eliminate other factors from the equation. Moreover, the Church’s historic 
interests in the Holy Land were no longer the principal consideration. The interests had 
been reformulated to encompass broader concerns. These entailed the rights of 
Palestinians in general and those of Arab Christians in particular. John Paul was 
constrained from moving forward until satisfied that these rights were capable of being 
addressed within a framework of diplomatic relations with Israel. As circumstances 
presented themselves, no real opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, 
while preserving solidarity with the Arabs, arose until the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf 
War. Only when Israelis and Arabs began to discuss a peaceful resolution of the 
Palestinian issue and only after Israel and the PLO recognized each other could the 
Pope’s desire to normalize relations be met. Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian partner 
was the quid pro quo for the Holy See’s diplomatic recognition of Israel.  
Weigel disputes the explanation for the Holy See’s change in policy given by 
Thomas Patrick Melady, United States Ambassador to the Holy See under the first 
President Bush, as well as that of Ray Flynn, Melady’s successor under President 
Clinton.147 Melady’s instructions from Secretary of State James Baker included the 
sentence, “You should also urge the Holy See to recognize the State of Israel.”148 
Moreover, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Melady was pressed by Senator Joseph Biden to advance the cause of diplomatic 
relations between the Holy See and Israel.149 Melady described how he promoted the 
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Tel Aviv during his tenure. However, he was out of office before public announcement of 
the signing of the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel 
on December 30, 1993.150  
Melady’s argument was not that American pressure influenced the Holy See to 
change its policy, but that necessary conditions came together only at the conclusion of 
the Gulf War. The resulting Madrid Conference provided the opportunity for real 
progress. Melady noted “There was no real movement for change in diplomatic status on 
the part of the Holy See until the start of the Middle East Peace Conference in October 
1991.”151 In support of this position, he described a meeting on July 29, 1992, with 
Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Secretary for Relations with States (Holy See’s “foreign 
minister”).  
Archbishop Tauran … was emphatic when he pointed out to the diplomats 
at the meeting that the “Holy See is taking advantage of the fact that Israel 
and the Arab countries are talking.” He said that Israel and the Holy See 
had decided to work together to “find solutions to the problems of their 
bilateral relations.” 
In response to my question, Archbishop Tauran told me that the Holy See 
“had not changed its conditions for normalization” but that “the 
international framework had changed.” He stressed the importance of the 
ongoing Middle East peace discussions. He repeated to me what he had 
previously said: Beginning with the Madrid conference, there was a “new 
context.”152  
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Change could now be considered because negotiations were finally underway between 
Arabs and Israelis, with Palestinians participating, albeit as part of a Jordanian 
delegation.  
However, the mere beginning of the Madrid Conference was not enough to secure 
an agreement. When the formation of a Bilateral Permanent Working Commission of the 
Holy See and the State of Israel was publicly announced on July 29, 1992, there was 
more than a year’s work ahead. That work began when serious negotiations started on the 
following November 2. Before agreement was reached, another decisive factor 
intervened, one that contributed to the final outcome. On September 9, 1993, as a result 
of the secret talks at Oslo, Yasser Arafat, on behalf of the PLO, recognized the State of 
Israel’s right to exist and agreed to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Equally important, 
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, reciprocated, recognizing the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people.153 Once the PLO agreed to recognize Israel, and 
was recognized as the representative of the Palestinians, there should have been no 
objection from Palestinians to the Holy See establishing diplomatic relations with the 
Jewish state.154
In order to understand better the position of the Palestinian Christians, the Holy 
See had kept in touch with the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox leaders in the Holy Land, 
continually briefing them on the progress of the negotiations. Before initialing the 
Fundamental Agreement, further inquiries were addressed to the three principle Arab 
Catholic prelates, including the Palestinian Michel Sabbah, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. 
According to Weigel they were asked, “Is the Fundamental Agreement something to be 
done in itself? Should it be done now? The answers came back, Do it, and do it now.”155 
With these answers, the Pope proceeded to have the agreement signed.156 All concerns 
having been met, the Holy See believed it had managed to respect each of the parties, 
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Israelis and Palestinians—Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The Pope’s team quickly 
discovered that this was not how the Arab Christians really thought. The dissent began 
when representatives of the Holy See delegation met with the local Catholic bishops on 
December 31, 1993, the day after the signing.157 Nonetheless, having signed the 
agreement, the Holy See could not turn back; ambassadors were exchanged within the 
year.158
Of special significance to the Pope were several provisions of the Fundamental 
Agreement that pertain to Catholic-Jewish relations, human rights and religious freedom, 
and the moral voice of the Holy See. The Preamble refers to “the unique nature of the 
relationship between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people,” and “the historic 
process of reconciliation and growth in mutual understanding and friendship between 
Catholics and Jews.”159 Article 1 provides: 
1. The State of Israel, recalling its Declaration of Independence, affirms its 
continuing commitment to uphold and observe the human right to freedom 
of religion and conscience, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and in other international instruments to which it is a party.  
2. The Holy See, recalling the Declaration on Religious Freedom of the 
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dignitatis humanae, affirms the 
Catholic Church's commitment to uphold the human right to freedom of 
religion and conscience, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and in other international instruments to which it is a party. 
The Holy See wishes to affirm as well the Catholic Church's respect for 
other religions and their followers as solemnly stated by the Second 
Vatican Ecumenical Council in its Declaration on the Relation of the 
Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra aetate.160
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Here the human rights agenda is given concrete expression, in keeping with the social 
teaching of the Church and the decisions of the Second Vatican Council.  
Article 2 was of special concern to Israel, but also fully consistent with the social 
teaching of the Catholic Church and the desire to improve its solidarity with the Jewish 
people: 
1. The Holy See and the State of Israel are committed to appropriate 
cooperation in combatting all forms of antisemitism and all kinds of 
racism and of religious intolerance, and in promoting mutual 
understanding among nations, tolerance among communities and respect 
for human life and dignity.  
2. The Holy See takes this occasion to reiterate its condemnation of hatred, 
persecution and all other manifestations of antisemitism directed against 
the Jewish people and individual Jews anywhere, at any time and by 
anyone. In particular, the Holy See deplores attacks on Jews and 
desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, acts which offend the 
memory of the victims of the Holocaust, especially when they occur in the 
same places which witnessed it.161
The unique role of the Holy See is highlighted in Article 11, preserving its moral 
voice while removing it from purely political conflicts between Israelis and Arabs.  
1. The Holy See and the State of Israel declare their respective 
commitment to the promotion of the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
among States and nations, excluding violence and terror from international 
life.  
2. The Holy See, while maintaining in every case the right to exercise its 
moral and spiritual teaching-office, deems it opportune to recall that, 
owing to its own character, it is solemnly committed to remaining a 
stranger to all merely temporal conflicts, which principle applies 
specifically to disputed territories and unsettled borders.162
With a peace process now underway, the Holy See had the freedom to support the 
process while retaining the right to be critical of abuses and defend the rights of all, 
especially Palestinians, according to the Church’s moral principles. 
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 Articles 4 and 5, without referring to Jerusalem, pertain to the Christian Holy 
Places and pilgrimages to the Holy Land.163 Pragmatically aware that Israeli control of 
the Holy City meant that Israel also controlled the Holy Places throughout the occupied 
territories, the Holy See accepted Israeli commitment to honor the “Status quo,” a 
reference to the Ottoman legacy concerning the rights and privileges of the various 
Christian communities. The important provision states,  
The State of Israel affirms its continuing commitment to maintain and 
respect the “Status quo” in the Christian Holy Places to which it applies 
and the respective rights of the Christian communities thereunder. The 
Holy See affirms the Catholic Church's continuing commitment to respect 
the aforementioned “Status quo” and the said rights.164  
 With respect to securing the legal status of the Catholic Church and respect for its 
rights in the State of Israel, the Fundamental Agreement has not had the desired effect. It 
took almost four years for the parties to conclude the Legal Personality Agreement 
pursuant to Article 3 of the Fundamental Agreement.165 Since then, the Knesset has 
failed to enact legislation giving force to the provisions of either agreement.166 Moreover, 
the Israeli Government told the Israeli Supreme Court in 2004 that it did not recognize its 
obligations under the Fundamental Agreement.167 Clearly, the Israeli Government has 
been stalling. It has refused to cooperate in the restoration of confiscated Church 
properties and has allowed local governments to tax Catholic institutions, thereby putting 
the financial viability of Catholic churches at risk.168 Until now the Holy See has resisted 
any temptation to suspend relations with Israel. The important role lies ahead, if and 
when a legitimate peace process gets restarted. At that time the Holy See will insist on 
having its say, particularly with regard to Jerusalem. In the words of Archbishop Tauran: 
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It is the view of the Holy See that every exclusive claim - be it religious or 
political - is contrary to the logic proper to the very City itself. I must 
insist: every citizen of Jerusalem and every person who visits Jerusalem 
should embody the message of dialogue, coexistence and respect evoked 
by the City. Exclusive claims cannot be backed up by numerical or 
historical criteria. 
Having said that, I must add that there is nothing to prevent Jerusalem, in 
its unity and uniqueness, becoming the symbol and the national centre of 
both the Peoples that claim it as their Capital. But if Jerusalem is sacred to 
Jews, Christians and Muslims, it is also sacred to many people from every 
part of the world who look to it as their spiritual capital or travel there on 
pilgrimage, to pray and to meet their brethren in faith. It is the cultural 
heritage of everybody, including those who visit it simply as tourists.169
B. A NEW HOPE FOR LEBANON 
From its conception under the French Mandate, Lebanon had been a Christian 
project, politically dominated by the Maronite Catholic community. After centuries of 
resisting and enduring minority status in an Islamic polity, the Maronites obtained the 
leading role in the new state. Critical to formation of the state was the 1943 National Pact 
of coexistence. Through this unwritten agreement between elites of the Christian and 
Muslim communities, Lebanon was to be the one place in the Middle East where 
Christians were a political power. A central provision of the Pact was that Christians 
would not seek alliances with the West and the Muslims would abstain from seeking 
political integration in a greater Syria or pan-Arab state.170      
In Lebanon, the Maronites would reinforce the uniqueness of their state by 
distinguishing the Lebanese from other Arabs through the historical pretence of 
Phoenician descent. This, combined with the Francophone orientation of Maronite 
education, further served to distance them from Lebanese Muslims and other Lebanese 
Christians.171 It became clear in the 1970s that a Christian “majority” was no longer real. 
The desire of Maronite elites to retain a leading position vis-à-vis the growing Muslim 
majority set the stage for the civil war that erupted in 1975. 
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The Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) ended with the political resolution provided 
by the Taif agreement in October 1989. The agreement was then “enforced” under the 
blunt guarantee of Syrian military occupation. Taif required amendments to the Lebanese 
Constitution. These enshrined an Arab identity for the country and the 1943 National 
Pact. Further, they reduced the powers of the Christian President, locating executive 
authority in the Council of Ministers led by a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister. Moreover, 
while Christians lost their dominant role in the Chamber of Deputies (parliament), the 
confessional division of the Chamber was still maintained. The seats were now divided 
equally between Christians and Muslims, instead of the six to five ratio Christians 
previously enjoyed. 172 However, even this overrepresentation in parliament did not 
satisfy many Christians. 
Rejecting arrangements made possible by Taif, the Christian wing of the 
Lebanese army, led by General Michel Aoun, attempted to repel the Syrian armed forces 
from Lebanon and establish a military cabinet with Aoun at the head. Intra-Christian 
conflict became violent when war broke out in 1990 between Aoun’s faction and those of 
the “Lebanese Forces,” a Maronite militia led by Samir Geagea. Syrian troops crushed 
Aoun, driving him into exile. Geagea refused to take part in the post-Taif government, 
preferring instead a federalist territorial division of the country to further safeguard the 
Christian minority. By 1994, Geagea was jailed and the Lebanese Forces proscribed. 
 
172 Lebanon’s last official census was in 1932, at which time Maronites constituted 28.7% of the total 
population, with other Christians making up another 21.3%, see Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered 
Country, trans. Philip Franklin (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996), 66.  
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and Coptic, maintain their respective seats in Iraq and Egypt. Two others, Greek (Melkite) and Syrian, have 
their seats in Syria. The Latin Patriarch is based in Jerusalem. All seven Churches sui iuris are in 
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Tried for crimes committed during the civil war and after, Geagea was found guilty and 
sentenced to life imprisonment for assassinating Dany Chamoun, his rival for political 
leadership of the Maronite community. He was the only militia lord not covered by the 
general amnesty enacted in an exercise of national forgetfulness.173
Throughout the civil war the Holy See channeled humanitarian assistance into 
Lebanon and made several direct attempts to assist the various factions in reconciling 
their differences. George Irani highlighted four high level fact-finding and mediation 
missions conducted by the Holy See between 1975 and 1980.174 Each of these was 
guided by three principles, which in turn reflected the Holy See’s moral assessment of the 
conflict in light of human dignity and the principle of solidarity. Irani listed the three 
principles as follows: 
(1) no party in Lebanon should jeopardize Christian-Muslim dialogue, (2) 
the behavior of some elements of the Christian community should not 
compromise the formula of coexistence sanctioned in the National 
Covenant of 1943, and (3) the Palestinians, who for years have suffered 
exile, should not fall victims to a “new injustice in Lebanon.”175  
None of the papal missions was successful while the conflict continued. However, the 
persistence and extent of the Vatican’s concern allowed no one to think that the Holy See 
was either ignorant of the facts on the ground or unconcerned with the well being and 
health of Lebanon. Indeed, the special concern of Pope John Paul II had been evident 
from the beginning of his papacy, especially from his 1979 address to the UN General 
Assembly, when he said,  
Connected with this question [the Palestinian question] is that of the 
tranquility, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon within the 
formula that has made it an example of peaceful and mutually fruitful 
coexistence between distinct communities, a formula that I hope will, in 
the common interest, be maintained, with the adjustments required by the 
developments of the situation.176
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Public awareness of the Holy See’s policy toward Lebanon revealed a deep 
division between the Pope’s priorities and those of large portions of the Maronite 
Catholic community. Many of the latter, as represented by Auon, Geagea, the Phalangist 
Party, and members of various orders of Maronite monks, were motivated by a desire to 
protect the Christians of Lebanon by either maintaining or enhancing Maronite 
ascendancy or by dividing the country into sectarian enclaves. Some in these groups were 
among the most ruthless opponents of the Palestinian refugees, whose presence in the 
country further upset the demographic factor in favor of the Muslims. Leaders of the 
Phalangist Party and their allies were responsible for welcoming Syrian and later Israeli 
military intervention into Lebanon. Furthermore, in 1982, the Phalangist militia 
massacred several hundred Palestinian refugees in their Beirut camps of Sabra and 
Chatila, while their allies in the Israeli Defense Force turned a blind eye.177
The Holy See saw things from an entirely different perspective. For John Paul II 
the only way out of the cycle of violence, the only way to restore security and prosperity 
to the Christians of Lebanon, was to save Lebanon itself. This would happen only 
through sincere commitment of all the religious communities to renewal of the National 
Pact of coexistence. For this, legitimacy needed to be restored to the institutions of 
government. Consequently, the Pope decided, on the advice of his Secretary of State and 
the apostolic nuncio to Lebanon, to recognize the post-Taif government represented by 
the Syrian installed President, Elias Hrawi. When the nuncio, Archbishop Pablo Puente, 
presented his credentials in early 1990, he antagonized the Christian mainstream that was 
then supporting Auon. When he later criticized the Lebanese Forces, he alienated the 
remainder of the Christian population.178  
From the Holy See’s perspective, resolution of the Lebanese crisis could only take 
place within a constitutional process derived from the Taif agreement. However, this was 
not possible as long as the Lebanese Christians felt excluded from the new order and 
excluded themselves from it—as when they boycotted the 1992 legislative elections and 
immersed themselves in al Ihbat al Mesihi, Christian disenchantment.179  
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Compounding the malaise was the continuing emigration of thousands of 
Lebanese Christians and the internal displacement of thousands more as a result of the 
civil war.180 Also troubling to the Christians was the rise of Hezbollah, a militant Shi’ite 
Islamic party. With connections to Iran and Syrian support, the Hezbollah militia 
replaced the PLO in conducting military operations against Israel from southern Lebanon. 
This would win Hezbollah wide public support and exemption from dismantling their 
armed wing, as required of all other militias by Taif.181 Making a respectable showing in 
the 1992 elections, Hezbollah entered the political arena, moderated the call for an 
Islamic state, agreed to play by the rules, and reached out to the Maronite Patriarch, 
Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, at his seat at Bkerke.182  
It was within this context, but in direct response to the intra-Maronite war, that 
John Paul II announced on June 12, 1991, that he was putting the entire Catholic Church 
at the service of Lebanon by convening a Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for 
Lebanon.183 Following a long period of preparation, the Synod took place at the Vatican, 
lasting for three weeks beginning November 27, 1995. It was ultimately concluded May 
10-11, 1997—during the Pope’s pastoral visit to Lebanon, his first such pilgrimage to the 
Middle East.184  
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The immediate purpose of the Synod was the spiritual renewal of the Catholic 
communities in Lebanon. Under the supervision of the apostolic nuncio, Archbishop 
Puente, the patriarchs and bishops of Lebanon mobilized all resources to prepare for the 
Synod. Ready to respond in what was becoming an exercise in self-examination, the lay 
faithful revealed their frustrations. Distrust of all institutions of Lebanese society was 
obvious, and both government and the leadership of the Church were subjected to great 
criticism. Frustration was particularly evident among Maronites, whose political leaders 
were exiled, imprisoned, or dead.185  
The lay faithful also had been estranged from one another by the intra-Christian 
violence only recently put down by Syrian force. In surveys distributed throughout the 
parishes of Lebanon, Catholics denounced the clergy and monastic orders for violation of 
their vows. They also criticized the disengagement of the clergy from issues of social 
justice and sought sterner political stands from their religious leaders.186 These 
revelations and the results of further research and reflection became the basis for the 
Synod agenda, one built from the ground up.187 From the work of preparation a new 
sense of identity and purpose was emerging. 
During the preparatory period, the synodal process was designed so that the 
Synod would foster solidarity through expanding circles of dialogue.188 The Maronites 
and each of the six other Catholic Churches began with the renewal of their own 
communities. Next, they would expand to involve themselves in dialogue with each 
other. In this way they would come to experience and model the meaning of unity in 
diversity. From this point, Catholics together would approach Christians of the Orthodox 
Churches and other communities in order to promote the ecumenical project. From these 
 
185 Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, and the 
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dialogues would emerge two strengthened institutions: the Assembly of the Catholic 
Patriarchs and Bishops of Lebanon and the Middle East Council of Churches. The final 
circle would come together as effective means for engaging with Muslim communities 
were found. Honest Christian-Muslim dialogue provided the only place from which the 
Lebanese society could renew a commitment to coexistence. 
When the Synod met in Rome in November 1995 it had 120 participants: 
seven patriarchs, eleven cardinals, twenty-two archbishops, seventeen 
bishops, ten heads and members of religious and monastic orders, 
seventeen “experts” and special assistants to the Secretary of the Synod, 
twenty-five priests, nuns and lay “auditors,” one representative of the 
Middle East Council of Churches, and eight “fraternal delegates”: five 
representing the Greek Orthodox Church and three representing the 
Lebanese Muslim authorities.189
The Muslim delegates, Mohammad Sammak, Seoud el-Mawla, and Abbas Halaby 
represented their respective Sunni, Shi’ite and Druze communities. The agenda was 
focused on three major issues, (1) Christian commitment to evangelical values; (2) 
Christian unity within the diversity of traditions; and (3) Christian-Muslim dialogue.190
The three Muslim delegates were frank in their participation. Sammak sought 
stronger Christian commitment to Arab culture and stressed the necessity for Arab 
Christians to be included with Muslims in any dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. 
Mawla spoke of Lebanon as the “unique alternative,” anchored in “Christian-Muslim 
partnership” based on justice and equality. For Halaby, Christians were “a necessity to 
the Arab world,” with whom “entente is sometimes difficult, but whose divorce is 
proscribed.” In the aftermath, they were impressed by the exercise of self-criticism and 
the Holy See’s commitment to Lebanon. On the other hand, they noticed tensions and 
were wary.191
The major tensions involved three matters: (1) witness to the Church’s social 
teaching versus involvement of the clergy in political issues; (2) full insertion of 
Lebanese Christians in their Arab environment; and (3) unity in diversity—how the 
Lebanese Catholics, particularly the Maronites, saw themselves in relation to their fellow 
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Catholic and Orthodox believers.192 These three tensions infected the text of the Synod’s 
Final Message, which, when published, caused an outburst from the Muslim leadership in 
Beirut.193  
The problem with the Final Message is that, for some Muslims, it sounded like the 
Maronite political agenda. Again, three points became the focus of Muslim fury: call for 
departure of Syrian troops and the references to “cultural pluralism” and “consensual 
democracy.”194 It would now be the task of John Paul II to enter this fray and put a final 
spin on the Synod’s meaning. The Final Message was not the Pope’s document, and it 
had no authority unless he adopted it as its own. His message would come only when he 
visited Lebanon in May 1997, to deliver the Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, A New 
Hope for Lebanon.195  
Having made the papal pilgrimage the hallmark of his universal ministry, John 
Paul II was the Holy See’s most important public diplomat. The climactic Mass on May 
11 drew more than 500,000 people, then the largest human gathering in the history of 
Lebanon, surpassed only by the million who demonstrated on February 14, 2006, the first 
anniversary of the assassination of Rafik Hariri.196 However, the central event of the 
pilgrimage was the Pope’s gathering with 50,000 young people at the Basilica of Our 
Lady of Harissa on May 10. Dagher describes the defining moment, 
The Pope was buoyed by the wild enthusiasm of these young, who were 
even clutching at the trees like clusters of human grapes. When they 
chanted “John Paul II, we love you,” he calmly observed: “Why don’t you 
say it in Arabic?” The remark was clearly allusive. It did not go unnoticed. 
The Roman Pontiff called the Christian youth of Lebanon to identify with 
its Arabic culture.197
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At Harissa he signed and promulgated A New Hope for Lebanon, entrusting his message 
to the Lebanese Christians represented by the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Sfeir.198
 A New Hope for Lebanon was a composite of spiritual and political themes, the 
latter framed from the particularity of Lebanon in light of the Church’s social teaching. 
The Pope encouraged a renewal of the Eastern Catholic Churches. Rather than imitate 
and import Western values, Lebanese Christians should return to the spiritual roots of 
their traditions found in the ancient church of Antioch, the place where the disciples of 
Jesus were first called Christians.199 Their task is to see a Christian future in the Middle 
East with confidence, and within the context of their Arab culture.  
The Pope called upon Christians to initiate “prophetic gestures of reconciliation” 
in ever widening circles of Lebanese society, including the political sphere. This was 
important in light of the Lebanese desire for amnesia about the recent past. He elevated 
human rights, equality, and democracy above particular points of law or specific 
constitutional provisions, calling for “total independence, complete sovereignty and 
unambiguous freedom” of Lebanon. Without mentioning either state by name, he said the 
presence of Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon created difficulties that threatened 
Lebanese democracy.200  
Finally, John Paul placed emphasis on “diversity,” distinguishing it from 
“pluralism,” possibly deferring to Muslim objections to the use of pluralism in the 
Synod’s Final Message.201 The difference between the two concepts is seen when the 
words are used to evoke a vision, a goal to be sought. “Pluralism” may well be a matter 
of fact; alone, however, the word connotes only a sense of many things. “Diversity,” on 
the other hand, lends itself to an evocation of unity, but unity wherein differences are 
honored and respected. In this case the Pope’s document uses diversity when speaking 
about the essential unity of the Church constituted by different Churches sui iuris. 
However, there is no such unity among communities belonging to different religions. 
Such communities remain simply many or different from one another unless effort on  
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behalf of solidarity is made. In the case of Lebanon, the Pope was asking all to see a 
common Arabic heritage and a common homeland as the way to social and national 
unity.  
In a lecture given at the Cultural Religious Center of Our Lady of Victory-
Nesbayh in Ghosta, Lebanon, in November 1997, Antoine Najm, a Lebanese Christian 
political scientist, presented a vision of Lebanon according to the teaching of A New 
Hope for Lebanon. Regarding the distinction of pluralism and diversity he said, quoting 
another scholar, 
Dr. Henri Kremona, in defining the terms “diversity” and “pluralism,” 
stated: “Diversity is quite different from pluralism. According to the 
Apostolic Exhortation, diversity is mentioned in the framework of 
diversity of spiritual heritage, in which its different components remain 
committed to five spiritual matters: one faith, the spirit of co-operation, 
repentance, hope and internal renewal. In this sense, the Apostolic 
Exhortation appeals to the diverse Patriarchal Churches to institute ‘a new 
mentality’ confirming the unity of the churches…. Diversity supposes a 
fundamental unity on the level of spiritual commitment, which exists in 
the dogma of belief…. Unity in diversity is a spiritual reality that must 
always be incarnated as a truth. As for the unity in pluralism, it remains a 
difficult task, because it tries to unify elements that are fundamentally and 
dogmatically different and spiritually separate…. Unity in the Church is 
realized through 'spiritual diversity,' and unity in the nation is realized 
through ‘religious pluralism.’”202
John Paul’s hope for Lebanon begins with a dose of realism. Nonetheless, a Shiite cleric 
and scholar, Sheikh Hani Fahs, said optimistically, “The visit of the Pope and the release 
of the Apostolic Exhortation have ushered Lebanon into a new era, an era marked by the 
final maturing of the idea of Lebanon in Muslims’ minds, and the idea of an Arabic 
Lebanon in Christians’ minds.”203  
According to Najm, for optimism to shape the political future of Lebanon, all the 
confessional communities require security. Two elements from A New Hope for Lebanon 
are essential for this to happen. First, as individuals, Lebanese should not be content to 
pursue mere “living together,” they should aim for “conviviality.” The aim is high, for it 
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requires a real commitment to the “other”—sharing life, not just space. The second 
element concerns “consensual democracy,” one of the issues that provoked the Muslim 
uproar over the Final Message, yet was retained in the Pope’s document.204  
Consensual democracy means a constitutional and parliamentary order that 
sometimes requires abandonment of rule by majority vote. Consensus rather than the 
number of votes cast may be required. Each community has a stake and each should have 
a veto over decisions that significantly touch upon the identity and life of that 
community. The Pope’s analysis suggested a form of confessional federalism. How that 
might be worked out in Lebanon is not stated, but it is for the Lebanese to decide. 
On October 26, 2000, John Paul II welcomed Fouad Aoun, the new Ambassador 
of the Republic of Lebanon to the Holy See. In his address to Ambassador Aoun, the 
Pope said,  
I listened attentively to what you told me about developments in the 
situation in southern Lebanon and of the political changes that have 
occurred in recent weeks. I hope that the love which all Lebanese have for 
their homeland will help them to live together, as they look to the future 
with a burning concern to "meet this challenge of reconciliation and 
brotherhood, of freedom and solidarity, which is the essential condition for 
Lebanon's existence and will cement your unity on this land which you 
love" (Apostolic Exhortation A New Hope for Lebanon, n. 120). The 
temptation to reawaken feelings that had grave consequences in the past 
can be avoided particularly through the growth of democracy and by 
giving all citizens the possibility to participate in their country's life, 
regardless of the religion or community to which they belong. 
…To succeed …, it is up to those who have been given the task of leading 
the nation to work for the common good with determination, unselfishness 
and perseverance, and to encourage an equitable sharing of 
responsibilities, without seeking privileges for oneself or for one's 
community. However, as I have already had occasion to stress, "this also 
requires that the country regain its total independence, complete 
sovereignty and unequivocal freedom" (A New Hope for Lebanon, n. 
121).205
 
204 Najm, “Envisioning a Formula for Living Together in Lebanon.” 
205 Pope John Paul II, Address of the Holy Father to the New Ambassador of the Republic of Lebanon 
to the Holy See, October 26, 2000, no. 2. 
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It remains to be seen whether the late Pope’s intervention in Lebanon will influence the 
evolving political settlement. Occasional news reports tell us something is unfolding in 
Lebanon, hopefully the outcome will be positive.206  
C. WAR OR PEACE IN IRAQ 
The opposition of Pope John Paul II to United States led military operations 
against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 derives from a moral analysis of the use of force known as 
the just war tradition. Derived from classical sources, Catholic formulation of the 
tradition began with St. Augustine in the fifth century and reached a definitive form in the 
thirteenth century in the political theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.207 Later, the just war 
tradition obtained secular sanction through the work of international lawyers led by 
Grotius.208 Mostly absent from political debate and public considerations in modern 
times, the just war tradition was revived in the post-Second World War era. It regained 
considerable currency beginning in the 1960s as a result of Pope John XXIII’s encyclical 
Pacem in Terris, the war in Vietnam, and the nuclear arms race that characterized the 
Cold War.  
The 1983 pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops of the United States, The 
Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, brought the just war theory into 
the mainstream of Western discourse on war and peace.209 The pastoral letter was framed 
to address the specific questions raised by the Cold War and nuclear deterrence; however, 
the letter called attention to two traditions of Christian witness and response to the issue 
of war and peace: the just war tradition and pacifism. While noting the validity of both 
positions for individuals, the American bishops recognized the responsibility of 
government for the security and safety of the state. Consequently, the principles of the 
just war tradition were viewed as the appropriate moral measures for political decisions 
regarding the use of force.  
 
206 See, e.g., Samir Khalik Samir, “Lebanon becomes once again a model for the Middle East,” 
AsiaNews, March 4, 2005, online at http://www.asianews.it/main.php?l=en (accessed February 2006). 
207 See Todd D. Whitmore, “The Reception of Catholic Approaches to Peace and War in the United 
States,” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching, 493-521, 494. 
208 See Stephen J. Pope, “Natural Law in Catholic Social Teachings,” in Modern Catholic Social 
Teaching, 41-71, 46-47. 
209 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our 
Response (Washington: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983). 
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The Challenge of Peace presents a complete statement of the modern Catholic 
formulation of the principles of the just war tradition. As noted by Catholic theologian 
Todd Whitmore, “The principles are divided into those that must be met in order to 
engage in war in the first place (jus ad bellum) and those that must be met in the conduct 
of war itself (jus in bello).”210 There are six jus ad bellum principles, stated here as 
distilled from Whitmore’s commentary on the bishops’ letter: 
1. Just cause—restricted in the modern era to self-defense and humanitarian 
intervention, wars of retribution are no longer permitted. 
2. Declaration by legitimate or competent authority—war declared by private 
individuals and groups are illegitimate.  
3. Right intention—the objective purpose of the war must be directed toward the 
just cause. 
4. Last resort—all reasonable nonviolent means of resolution must be exhausted. 
5. Reasonable chance or probability of success—measured not only by military 
victory, but by the restoration of proximate peace. 
6. Proportionality—the destruction caused by war may not outweigh the good the 
war seeks to achieve.211 
The jus in bello criteria are two: (1) proportionality—applied to the tactics used in 
combat operations; and (2) noncombatant immunity or discrimination—those not 
involved in fighting are not legitimate targets of violence, raising the problem of avoiding 
“collateral damage” to persons and property.212  
Today, no one expects the Pope to sanction a particular war as done on many 
occasions prior to the nineteenth century. The papacy has typically responded to war in 
the recent modern period through mediation and quiet diplomacy conducted from a 
position of neutrality. The interventions of Benedict XV and Pius XII conformed to that 
pattern during the two world wars. In the post-war period, the Holy See generally 
confined its involvement to humanitarian measures, general principles, irenic 
commentary, and moral condemnation concerning conduct used in wars underway. John 
 
210 Whitmore, “The Reception of Catholic Approaches to Peace and War in the United States,” 494. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid.  
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Paul’s 1991 public attempt to forestall the first Gulf War was an exercise of the papal 
office without precedent. While he did not take sides, the Pope’s intervention in 1991 
was, in effect, a prudential judgment that the United States was wrong.  
As seen in Chapter III, developments arising from the Cold War influenced the 
Church’s social teaching under Paul VI and John Paul II. They also shaped the position of 
the Holy See with respect to its diplomacy and judgment concerning American military 
intervention in Iraq. Since Pacem in Terris, the Holy See placed important emphasis on 
the United Nations and the responsibility of the international community to respect the 
legitimacy of the Security Council as the institutional locus for preserving peace and 
sanctioning the use of force in international conflicts. While the UN had not lived up to 
the promise envisioned by its founding, the Holy See had maintained and deepened its 
internationalism. Secondly, the bi-polar conflict of the Cold War brought a heightened 
suspicion of super power intervention in the developing world. This suspicion was 
highlighted first in Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio and sharpened by John 
Paul II in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.  
Thirdly, as related in Centesimus Annus, John Paul had witnessed the power of 
nonviolent methods to produce peaceful change in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe. Moreover, his efforts toward peace in the Middle East suggested the futility of 
armed conflict in resolving the problems of that region. Finally, he feared that Western 
military intervention in the heart of the Middle East would provoke an Islamic backlash, 
lending credence to the “clash of civilization” argument stemming from post-Cold War 
theories about the shape of the new world order.213 As a proponent of peaceful settlement 
of the Israeli-Arab conflict, Jewish-Christian dialogue, and Christian-Muslim coexistence 
in the Arab world, especially in Lebanon, John Paul, the leader of the world’s largest 
Christian community, had to consider not only the welfare of the Christian minority in 
Iraq, but also that of Arab Christians throughout the region.214 He also considered the 
international implications of an adventure exploited as Western crusade meets global 
jihad.  
 
213 See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
214 About 80% of Iraq’s approximately 550,000 Christians belong to the Chaldean Catholic Church 
united under the Patriarch of Babylon. The smaller Orthodox counter part is the Assyrian Orthodox Church 
of the East. See Dagher, Bring Down the Walls, 67-68. 
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For Pope John Paul II, the Catholic bishops of the United States, and most 
Catholic theologians, the just war tradition begins with a presumption against the use of 
force.215 From this perspective, war is not merely “the continuation of politics by other 
means.”216 Rather, war is an extraordinary measure, taken not simply to achieve 
legitimate goals, but only when necessary. As early as 1979, John Paul had reiterated the 
call made by Paul VI in his address to the UN General Assembly, “never again war, 
never again war!” That same year, he spoke to staff and students of the NATO Defense 
College, asking them to consider their mission as peacemakers, never once mentioning 
the fact that they were warriors by profession: 
Living and studying in a climate of international solidarity, you are able to 
meditate on the principles of peace: to consolidate ideas and to reinforce 
attitudes that promote it. Yes, the condition of the edifice of peace depends 
on the firmness with which the principles of its foundation are embraced. 
And so I would hope that at the core of your activities there would be a 
reflection on the great principles related to peace, and a renewed 
dedication on your part to their application.217   
A presumption against war trumped all other considerations when the Pope 
undertook his diplomacy to stop the 1991 Gulf War. He never articulated a full 
application of the just war criteria to the case. However, in light of Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, he agreed that there was just cause. Moreover, the use of force had been 
sanctioned by the UN Security Council and, internationalist though he might be, he had 
no complaint regarding the lack of legitimate authority, nor did he question the intent of 
those preparing to dislodge the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. His concerns focused on the 
other aspects of the just war tradition, those related to last resort, the probability of 
 
215 George Weigel, John Paul II’s biographer, and other neo-conservatives argue the just war tradition 
contains no presumption against war, resting on the duty of the ruler to uphold the peace of tranquillitas 
ordinis. See George Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American 
Catholic Thought on War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). The Bush administration 
sent Michael Novak to argue the neo-conservative Catholic view to officials of the Holy See, hoping he 
might convince them to abandon the presumption against the use of force. See Michael Novak, “An 
Argument That War against Iraq Is Just,” Origins 32, no. 36 (February 20, 2003): 593, 596.  
216 Whitmore, “The Reception of Catholic Approaches to Peace and War in the United States,” 516, 
referring to Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham (New York: Penguin, 1983). 
217 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Staff and Members of the NATO Defense College, February 8, 
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success, and proportionality. In a letter sent on January 15, 1991, to President George H. 
W. Bush, John Paul focused on the latter two of these principles, those that involve one’s 
judgment about the consequences of war. He said, 
In recent days, voicing the thoughts and concerns of millions of people, I 
have stressed the tragic consequences which a war in that area could have. 
I wish now to restate my firm belief that war is not likely to bring an 
adequate solution to international problems and that, even though an 
unjust situation might be momentarily met, the consequences that would 
possibly derive from war would be devastating and tragic. We cannot 
pretend that the use of arms, and especially of today’s highly sophisticated 
weaponry, would not give rise, in addition to suffering and destruction, to 
new and perhaps worse injustices. Mr. President, I am certain that, 
together with your advisers, you too have clearly weighed all these factors, 
and will not spare further efforts to avoid decisions which would be 
irreversible and bring suffering to thousands of families among your 
fellow citizens and to so many peoples in the Middle East. In these last 
hours before the deadline laid down by the United Nations Security 
Council, I truly hope, and I appeal with lively faith to the Lord, that peace 
can still be saved. I hope that, through a last minute effort at dialogue, 
sovereignty may be restored to the people of Kuwait and that international 
order which is the basis for a coexistence between peoples truly worthy of 
mankind may be re-established in the Gulf area and in the entire Middle 
East.218
In a letter sent the same day to Saddam Hussein, the Pope made similar remarks, hoping 
to convince the Iraqi leader that it was his duty to leave Kuwait: 
No international problem can be adequately and worthily solved by 
recourse to arms, and experience teaches all humanity that war, besides 
causing many victims, creates situations of grave injustice which, in their 
turn, constitute a powerful temptation to further recourse to violence. We 
can all imagine the tragic consequences which an armed conflict in the 
Gulf region would have for thousands of your fellow-citizens, for your 
Country and for the entire area, if not for the whole world. I truly hope and 
earnestly implore the Merciful God that all the parties involved will yet 
succeed in discovering, in frank and fruitful dialogue, the path for 
avoiding such a catastrophe. This path can be taken only if each individual 
is moved by a true desire for peace and justice. I am confident that you 
too, Mr. President, will make the most appropriate decisions and will take 




218 Pope John Paul II, Message to His Excellency George Bush, President of the United States of 
America, January 15, 1991. 
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peace. As I said publicly last Sunday, a demonstration of readiness on 
your part cannot fail to bring you honour before your beloved Country, the 
region and the whole world.219
The Pope’s concerns were that war in the Persian Gulf region would have tragic 
consequences, perhaps extending to the entire Middle East and the whole world. 
Moreover, he believed that the war would lead to injustices greater than those already 
endured by the invasion of Iraq. For him, the choice for war was offset by the apocalyptic 
vision of the aftermath. 
George Weigel claims in his biography of John Paul II that personnel changes in 
the Vatican and lack of attention to the views of the Holy See by Bush’s Secretary of 
State, James Baker, poisoned the Holy See against the war option.220 When the Pope 
received President Bush’s reply to his letter of January 15, it indicated the bombing of 
Iraq would begin on January 17.221  Weigel then relates the following, citing Archbishop 
Jean-Louis Tauran, Secretary for Relations with States (“foreign minister”) as his source: 
The next day, January 16, John Paul II telephoned President Bush to say 
that, while he was still praying for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, he 
hoped the Allies would win and that there would be few casualties if it 
came to war. With combat imminent, John Paul seemed to be making a 
plea for restraint in the conduct of the war, while underlying that the Holy 
See recognized that a gross violation of justice and international law had 
taken place in the invasion of Kuwait. Evidently, there was some concern 
that this was getting lost in the Pope’s insistent appeals for a negotiated 
settlement.222  
Contrary to popular opinion, the Pope never condemned the United States for its 
leadership in the 1991 Gulf War. The Pope, after all, was not the one morally empowered 
to make the decision, that role belonged to the UN Security Council and the political 
leadership of the nations involved. However, John Paul II’s efforts to block the launch of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 present a different case.  
 
219 Pope John Paul II, Message to His Excellency Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, January 15, 
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Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Pope John Paul sent 
the following telegram to President George W. Bush: 
SHOCKED BY THE UNSPEAKABLE HORROR OF TODAY’S 
INHUMAN TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE 
IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES I HURRY TO 
EXPRESS TO YOU AND YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS MY 
PROFOUND SORROW AND MY CLOSENESS IN PRAYER FOR THE 
NATION AT THIS DARK AND TRAGIC MOMENT. COMMENDING 
THE VICTIMS TO ALMIGHTY GOD’S ETERNAL MERCY, I 
IMPLORE HIS STRENGTH UPON ALL INVOLVED IN RESCUE 
EFFORTS AND IN CARING FOR THE SURVIVORS. I BEG GOD TO 
SUSTAIN YOU AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS HOUR OF 
SUFFERING AND TRIAL.223
The next day, in his regular general audience he began by saying, “I cannot begin this 
audience without expressing my profound sorrow at the terrorist attacks which yesterday 
brought death and destruction to America, causing thousands of victims and injuring 
countless people.”224 After military operations were begun in Afghanistan the Pope urged 
restraint, but he never condemned that mission.225 Indeed, for New Year’s Day 2002, 
celebrated in the Catholic Church as the World Day of Peace, the Pope released his 
annual message. In it he addressed the danger of terrorism and said, “Terrorism is built 
on contempt for human life. For this reason, not only does it commit intolerable crimes, 
but because it resorts to terror as a political and military means it is itself a true crime 
against humanity.”226 Immediately, he added,  
There exists therefore a right to defend oneself against terrorism, a right 
which, as always, must be exercised with respect for moral and legal limits 
in the choice of ends and means. The guilty must be correctly identified, 
since criminal culpability is always personal and cannot be extended to the 
nation, ethnic group or religion to which the terrorists may belong.227
 
223 Telegrama di Cordoglio del Santo Padre per l’Attacco Terroristico contra gli Stati Uniti 
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From the first signs that the United States was planning to use force to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power, however, the Pope raised his voice in opposition and 
intervened to prevent the American led drive to invade Iraq. When it became clear the 
UN Security Council was divided and was not going to sanction the invasion, the Pope 
increased his efforts, seeing that the United States would proceed nonetheless. On 
February 14, 2003, John Paul II received Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, a 
member of the Chaldean Catholic Church and long standing member of Saddam’s 
regime. After the meeting, Aziz told reporters that an American led invasion would be 
perceived as a crusade against Islam and that there would be dire consequences.228 
Meanwhile, the Pope had sent Cardinal Roger Etchegaray to see the Saddam Hussein in 
Baghdad. After meeting with the Iraqi leader, Cardinal Etchegaray said, at the conclusion 
of his diplomatic remarks, “Yes, peace is still possible in Iraq and for Iraq. I depart for 
Rome crying this out more strongly than ever.”229  
On February 19, Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Nuncio and 
Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, addressed the UN Security 
Council. The most important paragraph of the address stated,  
[T]he Holy See realizes that the international community is rightly worried 
and is addressing a just and urgent cause: the disarmament of arsenals of 
mass destruction, a threat surfacing not just in a single region, but 
unfortunately in other parts of our world. The Holy See is convinced that 
in the efforts to draw strength from the wealth of peaceful tools provided 
by the international law, to resort to force would not be a just one. To the 
grave consequences for a civilian population that has already been tested 
long enough, are added the dark prospects of tensions and conflicts 
between peoples and cultures and the deprecated reintroduction of war as 
a way to resolve untenable situations.230
While Migliore indicated the Holy See favored the matter being resolved through the 
Security Council, he was stating a position on the merits. In the Pope’s view, the invasion 
of Iraq would be unjust. Given the opposition to the 1991 war, one expected the Holy See 
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to oppose again in 2003. In this case, however, the judgment was not merely prudential; it 
was a moral judgment concerning the lack of just cause. John Paul was not persuaded by 
the Bush administration’s argument that prevention of a possible future use of weapons 
of mass destruction constituted a just cause for war, particularly when there were other 
means available and no weapons had been found by the UN inspectors.  
Finally, on Ash Wednesday, March 5, 2003, the Pope’s envoy, Cardinal Pio 
Laghi, the former Apostolic Nuncio to the United States, and friend of the first President 
Bush, met with the President to discuss the Iraqi matter. Following the meeting the 
President did not appear to answer questions, but his spokesman, Ari Fleischer, said, 
“‘The president thinks that from a moral point of view that the worst thing that could 
happen is for the American people to be attacked again’ … referring to the Sept. 11 
terrorist attacks.”231 Cardinal Laghi released a written statement that included the 
following: 
The Holy See is urging those in positions of civil authority to take fully 
into account all aspects of this crisis. In that regard, the Holy See’s 
position has been two-fold. First, the Iraqi government is obliged to fulfill 
completely and fully its international obligations regarding human rights 
and disarmament under the UN resolutions with respect for international 
norms. Second, these obligations and their fulfillment must continue to be 
pursued within the framework of the United Nations. 
The Holy See maintains that there are still peaceful avenues within the 
context of the vast patrimony of international law and institutions which 
exist for that purpose. A decision regarding the use of military force can 
only be taken within the framework of the United Nations, but always 
taking into account the grave consequences of such an armed conflict: the 
suffering of the people of Iraq and those involved in the military 
operation, a further instability in the region and a new gulf between Islam 
and Christianity. 232
On March 16, 2003, the Sunday before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, John 
Paul II told the crowd gathered in St. Peter’s Square for the Angelus,  
 
231 Bob Kemper, “Resolve Iraq in UN, papal aid tells Bush: Unilateral war is ‘illegal,’ he says,” 
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Cardinal Laghi said that an invasion of Iraq without UN support would be illegal and unjust, see Ibid. 
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The political leaders of Baghdad certainly have the urgent duty to 
collaborate fully with the international community to eliminate every 
reason for armed intervention. To them I direct my urgent appeal:  the fate 
of your fellow-citizens should always have priority. 
But I would also like to remind the member countries of the United 
Nations, and especially those who make up the Security Council, that the 
use of force represents the last recourse, after having exhausted every 
other peaceful solution, in keeping with the well-known principles of the 
UN Charter. 
That is why, in the face of the tremendous consequences that an 
international military operation would have for the population of Iraq and 
for the balance of the Middle East region, already sorely tried, and for the 
extremisms that could stem from it, I say to all:  There is still time to 
negotiate; there is still room for peace, it is never too late to come to an 
understanding and to continue discussions. 233
 The forcefulness of the Holy See’s opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom and the 
statement of the bishop heading the Romanian Byzantine Catholic Church in America 
that participation in the war would be sinful, prompted Edwin F. O’Brien, Roman 
Catholic Archbishop for the Military Services, U.S.A., to release a statement to Catholic 
members of the U.S. armed forces on March 25, 2003. In the statement Archbishop 
O’Brien said, "Given the complexity of factors involved, many of which understandably 
remain confidential, it is altogether appropriate for members of our armed forces to 
presume the integrity of our leadership and its judgments, and therefore to carry out their 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 The three cases related in Chapter IV are similar to two cases reported in Ideas 
and Foreign Policy, the volume edited by Goldstein and Keohane and referenced in the 
introduction to this thesis. Those two cases involve decolonization and human rights 
policies and they demonstrate how ideas in the form of principled beliefs shaped 
international consensus and national policies in the aftermath of the Second World 
War.235 The way the movement for decolonization and human rights policies arose from 
the ashes and confusion of the post-war period had parallels within the Catholic Church, 
by reason of the Church’s experience of the same history. Indeed, religious belief in the 
dignity of the human person as the source of human rights informed the founding of the 
UN and the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights twenty years before 
the same belief became the vehicle through which the Second Vatican Council committed 
the Church to the modern human rights agenda with Dignitatis Humane, the Declaration 
on Religious Liberty.236
Through the developmental method of its social teaching, the Church 
appropriated the lessons of history and read the signs of the times as requiring not only 
new insights, but also new doctrine. Henceforth, as changes occurred, diplomatic 
initiatives of the Holy See were filtered through the prism of the new doctrine. This filter 
required subordination of the Catholic Church’s own concern for institutional privileges  
to a broader vision in which interests are constituted by the agenda of human rights and 
the common good. This was seen in Israel as well as in Lebanon.  
In Israel, the Church gave little or no consideration to the Jewish people who 
lived in Palestine prior to the Second World War. Indeed, the posture of the Holy See had 
been solely concerned with maximizing Catholic rights and privileges. By 1967 all that 
had changed, and an option in favor of the Palestinians shaped the Vatican’s concerns. 
With the election of John Paul II, the Holy See appropriated the theological and moral 
 
235 See Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in 
International Relations, in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas in Foreign Policy, 111-138; Kathryn Sikkink, 
“The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in 
Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 139-170. 
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implications of the Holocaust and the necessity of pursuing the Jewish-Christian 
dialogue. Nonetheless, diplomatic relations with the Jewish state had to await the “new 
context” provided by the 1991 Gulf War and the Madrid Conference. 
Following the First World War, the Holy See was content to champion the 
Maronite character of the country as it began to shape its future independence. Before the 
Lebanese civil war, the Holy See’s diplomatic posture with respect to Lebanon had 
remained supportive of the Maronite hegemony. The civil war, and its 1990 climax in 
intra-Christian violence, provided the circumstances in which the logic of human rights, 
intra-Catholic relations, ecumenism, and Christian-Muslim dialogue shaped the Holy 
See’s interventions. The status quo would no longer serve, so the Pope began to take 
positions opposed by the Maronite community—to serve them meant serving Lebanon 
first.  
With respect to Iraq, the Holy See’s own ecclesial interests were focused in the 
small Christian minority, particularly the Chaldean Catholic community. When war 
became the issue, however, John Paul II argued not on behalf of this small constituency 
but from an internationalism first articulated by John XXIII and enhanced by Paul VI. 
The role of the UN as the institutional embodiment of international solidarity, along with 
the Pope’s interpretation of the events leading to the end of the Cold War, heightened his 
presumption against the use of force. From this perspective he feared the consequences of 
war on behalf of the international common good. 
As stated in the introduction, the argument defended through the evidence of three 
case studies is not the simple deduction of diplomatic policy from principled beliefs. 
Rather, the appropriation of beliefs through the development of the Church’s social 
teaching effected the Holy See’s perception of its interests, expanding them so that they 
encompassed much more than the rights and privileges of the Catholic communities of 
the Middle East. As Robert Jackson said in writing about decolonization, “In other words, 
ideas, far from merely serving as the handmaidens of military power and economic 




                                                
be.”237 What was true for the international community of states was equally true for the 
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